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Abstract
Subedi, Kul Prasad.Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December, 2018. A Framework
For Analyzing Advanced Malware And Software. Major Professor: Dr.Dipankar Dasgupta.
Vulnerabilities in software, whether they be malicious or benign are a major concern in
every sector. My research broadly focused on security testing of software, including malware. For the last few years, ransomware attacks have become increasingly prevalent with
the growth of crypto-currencies.
The first part of my research presents a strategy to recover from ransomware attacks by
backing up critical information in slack space. In this work, I designed RDS3, a novel
ransomware defense strategy, in which we stealthily back up data in the spare space of
a computing device, such that the data encrypted by ransomware can be restored. The
key concept is that unused space can backup critical data, which is fully isolated from the
system. In this way, no ransomware will be able to “touch” the backup data regardless of
what privilege it is able to obtain.
Next, my research focused on understanding ransomware from both structural and behavioral perspectives to design CRDETECTOR, crypto-ransomware detector. Reverse
engineering is performed on executables at different levels such as raw binaries, assembly
codes, libraries, and function calls to better analysis and interpret the purpose of code segments. In this work, I applied data-mining techniques to correlate multi-level code components (derived from reverse engineering process) to find unique signatures to identify
ransomware families.
As part of security testing of software, I conducted research on InfiniBand (IB) which
supports remote direct memory access without making two copies of data (one in user
space and the other in kernel space) and thus provides very low latency and very high
throughput. To this end, for many industries, IB has become a promising new interconnect protocol over Ethernet technologies and ensuring the security of is critical. To do
iv

this, the first step is to have a thorough understanding of the vulnerabilities of its current
implementations, which is unfortunately still missing in the literature. While my extensive penetration testing could not find any significant security loopholes, there are certain
aspects in both the design and the implementations that need to be addressed.
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1

Introduction

Malware is a type of malicious software that causes harm to computers, networks or users
which can include viruses, trojan horses, rootkits, bootkits, worms, scareware, ransomware,
and spyware. Ransomware attacks employ many tricks of Social Engineering (to get into
the system), Virus properties (propagation, triggering, and execution), cryptographic techniques (to lock the system), use remote command and control ( C&C) channel and cryptocurrencies. In addition, ransomware attacks exploit system weakness such as SMB vulnerabilities (MS-17-010) to get into the system. Ransomware attacks became very prevalent recently with the flourishing of crypto-currencies like Bitcoin. Due to their anonymous nature, crypto-currencies offer ransomware makers means of receiving ransom
money without being identified.One such security incident caused by a ransomware attack
infected 900 systems used by the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency [13].
According to the FBI [15], ransomware has become a billion-dollar-a-year criminal industry and is under continuous growth.

1.1

Terminology

Ransomware is a specialized malware which may perform denial of service using a variety of methods of extortion to get a ransom amount, including: Distributed Denial of Service(DDoS), Initial Attack, Data Breach , and Localized Denial of Service (DoS). DDoS
is an attack where a criminal will direct massive volumes of traffic to internet facing services such as a website. The traffic is not genuinely interested in visiting the website, but
instead is sent maliciously by the criminal to prevent legitimate users from accessing the
website. This is called a DoS or Denial of Service. These types of attacks are undertaken
from multiple different computers on the internet as opposed to single computer, a so
called distributed denial of service (DDoS). Initially, a small attack is performed followed
by an email to the victim notifying them that if they do not pay ransom, a large attack will
1

shortly follow. If the ransom is paid, the DDoS attack does not occur. Data breach is a
type of attack where hackers obtain confidential data from a company or organization [22]
and then demand the ransom in return for giving a commitment to avoid publishing the
data on the internet or publishing the fact that the company has suffered a data breach.
The victim organization has a fixed period of time to pay the ransom. After that window,
if the ransom amount is not paid, the criminals will make the data publicly accessible.
Localized DoS attack uses a type of denial of service attack that is localized to the victim’s machine. In this scenario, an attacker will run some malicious program know as ransomware on the victim’s computer system, usually without the victim realizing that their
machine has been compromised. The malicious program can make the data or the system
unavailable. A ransom is then required to return the system to its normal operating state.
Most commonly, the ransomware will encrypt all data with encryption technology and
demand a ransom in return for the keys to decrypt the data. This type of attack is called a
crypto-ransomware attack.
Similar to malware, ransomware utilizes numerous technical means (e.g., spam emails,
mal-advertisements, social engineering) to propagate to a victim computing system. Then
it will either lock the victim system (i.e., locker ransomware) or encrypt the data (i.e.,
crypto-ransomware) in the victim system. Finally, it will require the victim to pay ransom money to unlock the system or obtain the key for decrypting the data. According to
the recent Internet Security Threat Report [10], crypto-ransomware now dominates the
ransomware family. Therefore, I mainly focus on defending against crypto-ransomware in
this research.
Paying ransom money [14, 23] may not guarantee that victim will obtain the actual key
for decrypting the data attacked by ransomware. Even worse, paying ransom provides
incentive to the ransomware makers to improve their ransomware and launch more advanced ransomware attacks. The existing research on ransomware [69, 87, 46, 78, 42] is
focused mainly on designing effective ransomware detectors. Their ultimate goal is to de-

2

tect ransomware in a timely manner such that the system can block ransomware before it
causes more damage to the victim data. Most ransomware detectors [69, 87, 46] rely on
dynamic analysis [88], which usually allows the ransomware to run in order to observe
its abnormal behavior. This unfortunately implies that regardless of the effectiveness of
the detectors, some data are always encrypted by the ransomware before it is detected and
blocked. In other words, a recovery component seems indispensable to ransomware defense.

1.2

Typical Steps Associated with Ransomware

Figure 1 depicts the steps associated with crypto-ransomware. These steps are specific to
the ransomware execution sequences. The first step is used to generate the encryption key
which is later used for file encryption. The second step is used to transfer public key to
attacker. Command and Control (C2) server is used in the following step as shown later in
Figure 1 to store the public key. C2 server sends the corresponding encryption key to the
victim’s computer. Step four is used to encrypt the victim’s files. Normally, ransomware
encrypts the files with certain extensions as shown in Figure 5. After encrypting victim’s
files, the encryption keys are destroyed which is the fifth steps. The sixth step is used to
generate the message which is used to display the information necessary to make payment
to get the decryption key. These steps use the cryptographic algorithm implemented in the
underlying operating system. These algorithms are summarized as shown in Table 2. In
addition to these steps, the initial step is propagation strategy which is the avenue through
which an attacker gains access to the victim’s machine. There are different methods being used to propagate, as shown in Table 1. Figure 2 shows how ransomware progresses
with time by adopting the technologies. The first known ransomware attack is AIDS Disk
in 1989. The fundamental strategies are: Propagation Strategy, Malware Distribution,
Ransom Demand, and Payment Method. As progression in time, these strategies are come
in different ways. For example, propagation strategy is getting complex as innovation of
3

Figure 1: Steps of typical Crypto Ransomware where steps of execution are labelled with
sequence numbers.
new technologies. The commonly used strategies are shown in Section 1.3.
Figure 3 shows the varient of ransomware families evolve since 2010. Figure 4 shows the
corresponding codes involved in each steps. There are different researchers working on
these steps separately to develop defense strategy.

1.3

Ransomware Infection Strategies

Methods used to infiltrate into the victim’s computer are known as infection vectors. Most
commonly used in different ransomware families are: Email Attachments, Phishing Email,
Embedded Hyperlinks, Websites/Downloads, Drive-By Infections, and Exploit the vulnerable running services.
• Email Attachments: Emails sent to infect computers with ransomware typically
require action on behalf of the user. Emails always have an attachment and commonly contain a compressed Zip file attachment as shown in Figure 5, but it could
4
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2010
2013
2016
2019

Figure 2: Progression of Ransomware [16].

Figure 3: Illustration of ransomware families [35] as evolved with time.
ile

rs
t

En

e fi

Th

rF

de

PC
o

isk

D

ns
om

Ra

e

w
ar

cr
yp
W
tio
in
Lo
n
Ra
c
Re k
ns
v
P
M en re
om
m
i
t
l
o
w
To es n iu
ar
t
e
PCrrenone App m S
M
t
e
Y
Lo loc Lo ea ar
s S
W ckyk, C cke r C as
r
a
Sa nn De opy r, C ypt law
m ac liv Ca TB oW en
Sa ry ere t R L a fo
m /W d an oc ll B rce
,K c vi s ke it m
ill ry a Mom r, S co en
i
D
isk S Owar impn fot fin
e
,N
f , lo r e
ew fice Tes ckePay
D la r m
M
ad ocu Cry ent
a
m pt
en
ts

G

ID
S

A

Table 1: The list of the differnet ransomware families, propagation strategies, date appeared, cryptographic techniques used to encrypt date, and command and control (C and
C) methods.
FAMILIES
R EVETON
G P C ODE
C RYPTO L OCKER
C RYPTOWALL
F ILE C RYPTO
T ELSAC RYPT
CTB-L OCKER
C RYPTO M IX
C ERBER
P ETYA
S ATANA
J IG S AW
S HADE
WANNAC RY
S AM S AM

Propagation Strategy
Date Appeared
Accused of illegal activities
2012
Email Attachments
2013
compromised websites and email attachments
2013
compromised websites and email attachments
2013
compromised websites and email attachments
2013
compromised websites and email attachments
2013
Email Attachments
2014
Spear-Phising Email
2014
compromised websites and email attachments
2013
Link in an Email purporting to be a job application
2016
Email Attachments
2016
Word Document with Javascript
2016
Spam Email
2015
Samba Vulnerability
2017
Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) brute force
2018

Cryptographic Techniques
C and C Server
RSA and DES
Using MoneyPak
660-bit RSA and AES
Tor Network
2048-bit RSA
Tor Network
2048-bit RSA
Tor Network
2048-bit RSA
Tor Network
2048-bit RSA
Tor Network
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Onion Network
2048-RSA and AES-256 and ROT-13
P-2-P Network
2048-bit RSA and RC4
Hardcoded IP range
Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Salsa
Tor Network
256-bit AES in ECB
Hardcoded IP Address
RSA and AES
Onion Network
RSA-3072 and AES-256
Fixed Server as C and C server
RSA and AES combination
Onion Network
RSA and AES combination
Tor-Onion Network

also be a standard Word document. The email is instills with a sense of urgency to
the receiver. For example, "here is the status for the goods you ordered", if the user
does not recognize the order, which they will not recognize as fictitious, then making them are more likely to double click on the invoice to see exactly what the order
detail was. At that stage, they’ll infect the machine with ransomware. Emails are
not only the medium to send malicious files; there are other tools such as Skype,
instant messengers, and other messaging tools.
• Phishing Email : This infection method is one of the most common for infecting
organizations with ransomware. The main reason for this is that people are very
comfortable receiving emails. Typically, ransomware emails will masquerade as a
legitimate email from a major brand. There will be an element of social engineering
included in the email as shown in Figure 6, i.e. high discounts on electronic items
due to a Presidents Day sale. A lot of users will be customers of major brands, and
therefore the social engineering aspect tricks them into taking the immediate action
and clicking on the phishing link that’s included in the email.
• Embedded Hyperlinks : Embedded hyperlinks are typically contained within documents, such as Microsoft Powerpoints or Microsoft Word. Typically, the documents
look normal and do not appear to the user carry malicious content. Within the docu6

Figure 4: Illustration of phases in a typical crypto-ransomware sample.

ment, there is an innocent looking hyperlink that enticing users to click on it. When
users click on the link, the computer calls out to download ransomware and installs
it on the users computer. It is not only Office documents that are targeted with this
type of attack; Skype, instant messaging applications, and other types of applications that can send hyperlinks are also exploited. For example, a common approach
is for documents to be written up as resumes. Everything looks quite innocent without any and there is no macros or anything contained with in the document, leading
the reader to believe the document is safe. Within the document, there is a hyperlink to a Linkedin or another social media profile. More often than not when a link
is here, the reader will click the link to view the profile. A dangerous point here is
that URL shorteners can disguise the full URL, so it is impossible for the user to
understand exactly what they are downloading until it is too late.
7

Figure 5: Top file attachments seen in ransomware-related spam during 2016 [16].
• Websites/Downloads : Downloading software from the web is highly prone to subjecting one’s machine to download ransomware. General web browsing brings the
risk of browsing onto infected sites that provide the path for the ransomware to access a user’s computer. The downloaded applications need to verify using a cryptographic mechanism as shown in Figure 7. Downloading files from the Internet is
another dangerous practice area. These are often research papers, executables, utilities, or software libraries that a user expects to be legitimate, but even these can be
fraught with danger.
• Drive-by Infections : There is a ransomware infection where there is no specific
user interaction required. All the user must do is browse the web. A very common
method for these drive-by infections is malvertising [66]. This is the advertising
networks that serve up ads on user as user is browsing, get infected and get malware into the user computer.
• Exploit the vulnerable running service : This infection vector uses the exploit kit.
Exploit kits are tools used by criminals that are designed to identify vulnerabilities
8

Figure 6: Example of Phishing Email.

on machine and exploit them. The exploit kit identifies if a vulnerability exists on
computer and then downloads ransomware onto computer. Example of such exploit
kit is angler [106]. Angler was used for serving up locky ransomware in early 2016.
There are other exploits kits: nuetrino [73], magnitude [97], and rig [91].

• External Storage : This infection vector uses the external storage such as USB devices or drives that users are plugging into computer, this is the way malware can
get into computer directly from the storage device.
9

Figure 7: Shows software application signature verification for integrity checking.

1.4

Cryptographic Techniques

Ransomware uses cryptographic techniques from the underlying operating systems to
encrypt the victim’s data. As shown in Table 2, there are two basic functionalities: Encryption and Confidentiality. Private key encryption uses a secret key to encrypt the message. The private key encryptions are divided into two main categories: stream ciphers
and block ciphers. Stream ciphers use a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), also
called a keystream generator, together with One Time Pad (OTP) encryption. Block ciphers are keyed permutations which operate on blocks of bits. The size of block depends
on algorithms. The block cipher uses different modes of operations to encrypt the message such as Electronic Code Book (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), and Counter
mode (CTR). Authentication is achieved by using message authentication code (MACs)
algorithms. There are two variants: one based on block cipher and one based on a universal hash function. Public key encryption algorithms are based on number theoretic difficult problem. The Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm relies on a trapdoor one-way function.
One-way permutation is made public and used for encryption, while the trapdoor is kept
private and used for decryption.
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Table 2: Cryptographic Techniques.
Encryption(Confidentiality)
Private Key Block (DES, AES-ECB,-CBC,-CTR)
Stream (PRNG and OTP)
Public Key Key Exchange(RSA, DH)
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Authentication(Integrity)
Key-Based(CBC-MAC)
Hashing (MD5, SHA)
Digital Signature

2

BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

Ransomware attacks use many tricks of social engineering (to get into the system), virus
properties (propagation, triggering and execution), cryptographic techniques (to lock system), use remote command and control (C&C) channel and crypto-currencies. In addition, ransomware attack exploits system weakness such as SMB vulnerabilities (MS17-010), weak credentials to get into the system. Ransomware generally encrypts the
data in a victim’s computer and demands for ransom before the user can obtain the decryption key. Cyber-criminals are using ransomware attacks frequently because it is very
easy to make quick money. Moreover, the monetary transactions performed remained intractable due to the use of crypto-currencies like Bitcoin. Each year, new ransomware is
released with advanced exploit techniques and attack vectors. In May 2017, a widespread
ransomware campaign was launched affecting as many as 150 countries including the
United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, France and Japan. The latest version of
this ransomware is named as WannaCry, WCry or WannaDecryptor and requested a ransom amount of 0.1781 bitcoins roughly $300 US dollars [26]. Recently in March 2018,
another variant of ransomware is named as SamSam and impacted multiple industries including City of Atlanta, Government and requested a total of roughly $900K US dollars
ransom [17].

2.1

Tracking Ransomware Payment Methods

Ransomware attacks became very prevalent in recent years. As cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin with the flourished. Due to their anonymity, crypto-currencies offer ransomware
makers an effective means of receiving ransom money without disclosing their identities.
Recently in March 2018, another variant of ransomware is named as SamSam and impacted multiple industries including City of Atlanta, Government and requested a total of
roughly $900K US dollars ransom [17]. Analysis of steps in financial transaction [63] has
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been researched to track which Bitcoin exchange used. Tracking ransomware end-to-end
[63] found that many ransomware operators cash them out using BTC-e, a now-defunct
Bitcoin exchange. Connection-monitor and connection-breaker [33] detects ransomware
by monitoring the connection between the victims computer and the Command and Control(C2) server.

2.2

Monitoring File System Activities

Several works have been done in ransomware Analysis. Cutting the Gordian Knot [70]
presents results of a long-term study of ransomware attacks that have been observed in the
wild between 2006 and 2014. This research shows that ransomware attacks have evolved
by analyzing more than 1300 samples belonging to 15 different classes of ransomware. It
showed that ransomware can be detected by monitoring the activities in the File System.
In addition, UNVEIL [69] creates an artificial user environment and detects ransomware
when it tries to interact with the environment. Another file-system-based ransomware detection is done in [87]. ShieldFS [46] creates a protective wrapper around the Windows
operating system that is immune to Ransomware. It monitors the low level file system
activity and updates an adaptive model. Whenever a process violates that model, it is
marked as malicious and transparently recovers all the original files. The limitations of
the file-system monitoring studies are unable to detect the process hallow injection technique [28].

2.3

SDN Based Detection Technique

Modern techniques such as Software Defined Networking (SDN) has also be used to
detect and mitigate the ransomware. Researchers [41, 42] presented a novel SoftwareDefined Networking (SDN) based detection approach that utilizes the characteristics of
the ransomware communication. Based on an observation of network communication between two crypto ransomware families, namely CryptoWall and Locky, they concluded
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that an analysis of the HTTP message sequences and their respective content sizes is
enough to detect such threats. Researcher [48] proposed a solution leveraging a recent
trend in networking hardware, that is programmable forwarding engines (PFEs). PFEs allow collection of per-packet, network monitoring data at high rates. They have used this
data to monitor the network traffic between an infected computer and the command and
control (C&C) server. Other techniques such as honeypot-based-detection [78] are also
used.

2.4

Ransomware on Mobile Devices

HelDroid [36] studies the behavior of ransomware on android devices and propose a
method to detect malicious app at the application layer. Similarly, Ngram opcode analysis
[68] proposed a machine learning approach called n-gram opcode features to identify and
categorize android malware. Automated detection and analysis of android ransomware
[105] describes the basic android component and developed an automated analysis of
the threats. They describes the basic Android component and manifest, the reason that
android is prevalent and why attacks emerged?. And analyzed and penetrated malicious
ransomware which threats mobile security now with our developed automated analysis
approach for such mobile malware detection.
Yang et. al, [89] prevents the android platform from ransomware by detecting process and
specific files and directories using statistical methods.

2.5

Ransomware Mitigation on Computers

Kharraz et al. [70] presented results of a long-term study of ransomware attacks that have
observed in the wild between 2006 and 2014. They showed how ransomware attacks have
evolved by analyzing more than 1,300 samples belonging to 15 different categories of
ransomware. They demonstrated that ransomware can be detected by monitoring the activities in file systems. In addition, Kharaz et al. [69] created an artificial user environ14

ment and detected ransomware when it tries to interact with the environment. Another file
system-based ransomware detection was performed in [87]. ShieldFS [46] created a protective wrapper around the windows operating system that are immune to ransomware.
It monitors the low-level file system activity and updates an adaptive model. Whenever
a process violates that model, it marks that process as malicious and transparently recovers all the original files. PayBreak [71] tried to recover data corrupted by ransomware
by extracting the encryption key. However, such a solution can only work when the ransomware utilizes symmetric encryption or hybrid encryption. Detecting function call
related to crypto library [103] has been performed. However, it only consider in binary
level. Several studies have been done in Malware Structural Analysis using Reversing Engineering and Static Analysis. Statistical Structures [39] presents the analysis of malware
performing assembly code analysis to identify and classify the malware. Another work
focused on malware using PE file structure analysis [104]. Taxonomy based studies [34]
present an approach for preventing and detecting ransomware. The focus of our work is to
monitor the encryption process of the victim’s data.
Mercaldo et al. [75] used a static analysis method on Android system to automatically
process ransomware sample and performed with the goal of observing the malicious behavior.
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3

Proposed Research

In this research, the goal is to design and implement a framework to analyze advanced
malware and software. To achieve this goal, the following objectives are needed to be
fulfilled.
• Collect a ransomware sample and perform initial pre-analysis.
• Design a recovery component in ransomware defense.
• Design a detector component based on reverse engineering and static analysis.
• Implement the recovery and detector components of the proposed framework.
The recovery component requires creating backup data, such that the data encrypted by
ransomware are always recoverable. In general, if the victims periodically back up their
data up using external storage media or public cloud services, the ransomware attack
would never even become an issue. However, many users are reluctant to back up their
data for the potential ransomware attacks, due to three concerns. First, people usually
do not anticipate that they will become ransomware victims until they are attacked. Second, periodically backing up data will creates an additional work burden. Third, backing
up data in external storage media or public cloud services requires the users budget for
purchasing hardware equipment or cloud services. If a cloud storage service is used, additional expenses will be required for Internet access.
The first concern can be mitigated by raising the awareness of ransomware attacks through
education or media campaigns. The second concern can be resolved by automating the
backup process so that the users can be liberated from such an ongoing burden. This work
aims to address the third concern, which is the most challenging obstacle facing security against ransomware today. Having observed that most computing devices usually
possess a certain amount of spare storage space, I design a defend against ransomware
framework (DARFR), a ransomware defend strategy by taking advantage of spare space
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to stealthily store a certain amount of redundant data and detection using static analysis
and reverse engineering approach. This approach more fully utilizes the existing computing resources to defend against ransomware, eliminating the need of purchasing additional unnecessary computing resources. DARFR consists of two main components, a
detector component: CRDETECTOR and a recovery component: RDS3. Figure 8 shows

Figure 8: Proposed Framework: Defend Against Ransomware FRamework (DARFR)
architecture.
the three objectives mentioned above, with their inter-dependencies in the task lists. The
detector component monitors the computing device, and once the ransomware is detected,
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will take action to block the ransomware and inform the recovery component. The recovery component will periodically back up the data to the spare space on the device. Once
the ransomware has been detected by the detector, it will take action to restore the data
corrupted by the ransomware.
To design DARFR, I face two main issues: 1) How can I prevent ransomware from accessing to the backup data even though it is able to obtain a high privilege? By escalating to
a high privilege, the ransomware can easily gain access to the backup data, and simply
encrypts them to attack our design. Previous work [46] unfortunately cannot address the
issue; 2) How can I effectively utilize the spare space? This is a practical issue, since a
computing device usually possesses a very limited amount of spare space, which is usually not able to store a mirror copy of the entire data. To address the first issue, I separate
the entire storage medium into a regular volume and a backup volume. The regular volume is managed by a regular user OS which is for daily use; the backup volume is managed by a light-weight OS, which only runs the small backup/recovery applications. Both
OSes are further isolated in such a way that, regardless of the privileges the ransomware
manages to obtain in the user OS, it will not be able to access the backup volume. To address the second issue, I propose the following approach: First, back up the data in an
incremental manner by utilizing delta encoding; Second, I offer flexibility to the user on
determining what data will be backed up by allowing the user to stealthily mark his/her
important files. Here “stealthily” means that these “marks” are only recognizable by the
recovery component rather than the ransomware. This is necessary as it can present ransomware from learning what data may be critical to the user.
The following are the task level breakdowns of each objectives:
• Collect malware samples from different sources such as virus total, virushare, and
from different research projects such as Shieldfs [46] and open source malware
repository theZoo[21].
• Create an isolated, controlled test enviroment.
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• Selection of suitable software-based isolation techniques (docker, linux container,
virtual machine(VM) etc) for first objective.
• Initialize a key pair (pk, sk) for asymmetric encryption by running (pk, sk) ← KGen(λ ),
where λ is a secure parameter. The public key pk is distributed to VM1, and the
private key sk is kept secret in VM2. The device owner picks a credential, and
keeps it in a secure location.
• Design and implement a marker generation algorithm to mark the files are “important” for first objective.
• Design and implement a backup application to pull the data from the regular volume for first objective.
• Design and implement a data recovery application to restore the encrypted data for
first objective.
• Perform the security analysis for DARFR.
• Prepare ransomware families from the collected samples based on propagation
strategies, date appeared, cryptographic techniques used to encrypt date, and command and control (C and C) methods.
• Design and implement CRSTATIC analyzer, which consists of assembly instruction
extractor, DLLs extractor, and functions extractor.
• Apply FP-Growth algorithm for association rule mining to generate unique signatures.
• Calculate Cosine Similarity measure between ransomwares as well as between benign binaries.
• Identify dlls used by ransomware and corresponding functions used.
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• Build a signature database based on association rule, cosine similarity, and dlls related to cryptography.
• Implement DARFR framework for analyzing advanced malware/software.
The next chapter will provide detail implementation of the recovery component RDS3 of
the framework DARFR.
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4

Recovery from Ransomware Attacks

Ransomware attacks are increasingly prevalent with the flourishing of crypto-currencies.
As the most harmful variant of ransomware, crypto-ransomware encrypts the victim’s
valuable data in exchange for ransom money. Paying the ransom money, however, does
not automatically guarantee recovery of the data being encrypted. Most of the existing
studies on ransomware defense purely focuses on ransomware detection. A few of strategies consider data recovery from ransomware attacks, but they are not able to defend
against ransomware which obtains a high system privilege. In this work, I design RDS3,
a novel ransomware defense strategy, in which I stealthily back up data in the spare space
of a computing device, such that the data encrypted by ransomware can be restored. Our
key idea is that the spare space which stores the backup data is fully isolated from the ransomware. In this way, the ransomware is not able to “touch” the backup data regardless of
the what privilege it can obtain. Security analysis and experimental evaluation show that
RDS3 can mitigate ransomware attacks with an acceptable overhead.

4.1

Isolation Techniques

Secure computation requires a secure processing environment which can ensure the protected resources (e.g., memory and peripherals) will not be tampered or eavesdropped
by the adversary. This usually relies on isolation techniques, by which the protected resources will be completely isolated from the non-secure environment. In general, isolation can be achieved using either hardware or software. The hardware-based isolation
includes arm trustzone, intel software guard extensions(sgx) etc.
The software-based isolation completely depends on the confinement provided by the
layers of software or kernel. It can be achieved by various tools and techniques. One example is chroot, which provides some form of file system isolation for non-root processes.
However, users having root privileges can easily escape from chroot isolation. Another
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popular tool for isolation is software container, e.g., Docker [76] and Linux containers
[53]. The most popular way of achieving software-based isolation is via virtual machine
monitors. A virtual machine (VM) is a virtual computer system, which can be viewed as
an isolated independent software container with an operating system and applications inside. Multiple VMs can be put on a single physical computer, enabling multiple operating
systems and applications to run on one single physical host computer. As a thin software
layer stays between host operating system and the guest operation system, the virtual machine monitor can decouple the virtual machines from the host and dynamically allocate
computing resources to each virtual machine as needed. Popular virtual machine monitors include vmware vsphere [24], citrix xenserver [25], Microsoft Hyper-V [6], Oracle
VirtualBox [81], etc.

4.2

System and Attack Model

System model. I mainly consider computing devices that are equipped with mass storage.
These include servers, desktops, laptops, etc. I do not consider those computing devices
which are equipped with limited resources, e.g., smart phones. This is because I rely on
the assumption that the computing devices being protected should have sufficient empty
space, which is not necessarily true for those devices (smart phones, smart watches, etc.)
equipped with limited resources.
Attack model. I only consider crypto-ransomware that tries to encrypt the data on the
victim device. After being able to get itself installed in a running environment, the ransomware can escalate its privilege to a level equal to the operating system which controls
the environment (e.g., root privilege). This may be achieved by exploiting various system
vulnerabilities [20, 64]. I do not consider other types of malware which exhibit different
attack behavior.
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Figure 9: An attack on ShieldFS.
4.2.1

Attack Scenarios

The sole existing work for ransomware defense which includes both the detector component and the recovery component is ShieldFS [46]. ShieldFS automatically shadows a
file to a shadow drive whenever it is modified, and such a shadow copy can be used to recover the file encrypted by the ransomware. However, if the ransomware can obtain high
system privilege and can have access to the shadow copy, it can simply encrypt both the
original copy and the shadow copy, rendering the file unrecoverable (see Figure 9). Although ShieldFS claims to make the shadow drive read-only to deny any modification
request, this cannot work if the ransomware obtains high privilege (e.g., root privilege).
This section presents our main design, RDS3, a Ransomware Defense Strategy utilizing
Spare space to Stealthily store a certain amount of backup data. Our design aims to defend against ransomware which can obtain high system privilege.

4.3

Key Insights

Before presenting our main design, I first describe our key insights by discussing a few
questions below.
Question 1: Why are backup data necessary for ransomware defense?
A main objective of ransomware defense is to restore the data encrypted by ransomware.
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To achieve such a goal, a straightforward solution could be to obtain the decryption key.
This may be possible if the ransomware utilizes symmetric encryption, since the key was
present in the victim computing device in the past which may be extracted [71]. However,
such a solution cannot work when the ransomware directly or indirectly utilizes asymmetric encryption, which is common the existing ransomware. For asymmetric encryption, computing the private key by brute force is usually not possible considering the large
key space used by the ransomware (e.g., an RSA key is at least 1024-bit). Therefore, obtaining the decryption key without paying the ransom money seems infeasible. Without
obtaining the decryption key, the only option for recovering data being corrupted by ransomware is to create backup data or through creating backup data.
Question 2: Where to store the backup data?
Simply relying on external storage (e.g., a mobile disk or a cloud storage provider like
Amazon S3) is not necessarily good, since it requires the user to pay for additional hardware or services and puts an additional burden on the user to maintain an additional medium.
By observing that most computing devices usually possess a certain amount of spare
space (see Section 4.6), I propose to utilize a portion of the spare space to store the backup
data. This is advantageous as it eliminates the need to purchase additional storage media/services. Most importantly, for the first time, I design a secure system which can mitigate ransomware attacks by fully utilizing the remaining resources in a computing device.
Question 3: How to make the space which stores the backup data inaccessible by ransomware?
A question that remains unanswered is how to ensure that the ransomware is not able to
encrypt the backup data stored in the spare space, regardless of its privilege. Intuitively,
this can be achieved by restricting the privilege the ransomware can obtain, and meanwhile storing the backup data stealthily in the spare space. I introduce a regular volume
and a backup volume. The regular volume is used for storage of regular data, while the
backup volume is used for storage of backup data. Note that the backup volume is built
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using the spare space. To prevent the ransomware from having access to the backup volume by escalating its privilege, I leverage isolation techniques. Specifically, a user operating system is introduced to manage the regular volume, with all the applications for daily
use. A light-weight operating system is introduced to manage the backup volume, with a
few small applications simply supporting backup and recovery functionality. Then, an isolation technique is introduced to prevent the user OS from accessing the backup volume.
This ensures that even though ransomware can compromise the entire user OS and obtain
the root privilege, it is still not able to access to the backup volume, as the backup volume
is transparent to the user OS.
Question 4: When to back up the data?
By observing that ransomware always needs to modify the victim data (e.g., over-write
the data with their encrypted version, or simply delete data which is also an over-write
operation), ShieldFS [46] creates a shadow file copy each time a modify operation is performed on a file. This may be problematic, as a piece of ransomware which is able to obtain root privilege can easily observe this special system behavior and intercept into the
back up process to disturb the defense (e.g., corrupt the shadow copy). The aforementioned issue is due to the fact that the back up process occurs when ransomware is already
present in the system. To address this issue, I move the back up process backward, such
that data will be backed up before the ransomware is present. However, this makes it challenging to determine what data need to be backed up, as the system is unable to anticipate
no knowledge about what data the ransomware will corrupt.
Question 5: What data will be backed up?
To defend against ransomware which can obtain root privilege, it is necessary to back
up data before the ransomware is present in the victim system. However, this sacrifices
the advantage of knowing what files the ransomware is “touching“. Without this knowledge, the system is not able to identify which files which will be most likely corrupted
by ransomware. One remediation could be to back up all the files in the regular volume,
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which is unfortunately infeasible considering the spare space in a computing device is
usually small. I address this issue from another angle. I select the files be backed up based
on their “importance” to the device owner. However, to identify whether a file is important or not is not straightforward. I believe a reliable way is to allow the device owner to
make this decision, as he/she is the right person who knows whether a file is important
to him/her. Specifically, the system marks each newly created file as “unimportant” by
default, and a system tool is provided to allow the device owner to re-mark any file as
“important.”
Note that we should prevent ransomware from learning the “important” information. Otherwise, it may take advantage of this information to launch more advanced attacks, e.g.,
stealing important files (which only incurs read operations and is difficult to be detected)
and demanding for ransom money by threatening to release them to public. To protect
the “importance” information, I encrypt it via asymmetric encryption. Specifically, the
“importance” information is encrypted using a public key. The ransomware is not able
to obtain the corresponding private key, and is thus not able to decrypt this information.
For different files, the same “importance” information will be encrypted into different
cipher-texts, such that the ransomware is not able to learn whether any given files are in
the same “importance” category. To achieve this, I embed the file ID into the encryption.
In addition, I embed a large nonce when performing encryption, such that with negligible
probability, the same cipher-text can be re-generated for the same file by knowing the file
ID.

4.4

Design Details of RDS3

Ransomware is a specialized category of malware which uses different attack avenues to
infiltrate into the victim’s device (e.g., desktop computers, servers, mobile devices etc.)
and uses cryptographic algorithm to encrypt the victim’s critical data. To protect one’s
files against ransomware attacks, a straightforward solution could be to periodically back
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up valuable data using external storage media (e.g., a mobile disk) or external storage services (e.g., Amazon S3 or Microsoft Azure storage ). However, this straightforward solution requires additional overhead such as buying external hardware, external services
etc. It may incur some additional costs as well. This may prevent a lot of users from using such a solution. In this research, I designed and implemented RDS3 through a novel
technique which can utilize spare storage space in the computing system for backup purposes using isolation technique. Every system has some additional disk space reserved
for future uses. This spare disk can be isolated from the existing system such that it remain secure and not accessible to any malware or ransomware. The regular disk contains
user operating system and user apps are running on it. In order to configure spare disk as
a backup system it must contains an operating system. The operating system to be run
on backup volume must be lightweight and efficient since its running only backup and
recovery program and some operating system core components. Hence, a spare disk is
configured to have only tiny operating system capable of running backup and recovery
program. Many studies have examined ransomware detection however most of them do
not address the issue of the corruption window. The corruption window Figure 10 shows
that there are three states of a basic ransomware detection system. Let us say that at time
t0, ransomware gets installed, at time t1 ransomware encrypts the data and at time instant
t2 ransomware is detected and is blocked by the detection engine. This detection methods
does not address the data loss between the time frame t2 and t1.

Figure 10: Corruption Window
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I leverage virtualization and emulation technology to design a system model consisting
of three core components. To avoid the ransomware from having access to the backup
data by obtaining root privilege, I leverage novel isolation techniques. At the same time,
introduce secret to differentiate legitimate users and ransomware. The basic idea is twofold: First, the storage space for storing the backup data (i.e., the back-up space) will be
isolated from the storage space for storing the regular data; Second, having access to the
back-up space requires certain secrets which restricts the access from ransomware since it
does not possess such secret.
I are now ready to present my main design, RDS3. Let (KGen, AEnc, ADec) be a secure
asymmetric encryption scheme.
The overall architecture of RDS3 is shown in Figure 11. I create two volumes, a regular
volume and a backup volume over the underlying storage medium (e.g., disk). A user operating system is used to manage the regular volume for daily use, e.g., all the daily user
applications are run within this OS, and all the user data are stored in the regular volume.
A light-weight tiny OS is used to manage the backup volume for backup purposes. Only
a few applications (e.g., backup app and recovery app) are run in this tiny OS, and only
the backup data are stored in the backup volume. All the computing resources (e.g., storage space, memory) and components (e.g., user OS, backup OS) are managed by a virtual
machine monitor. The isolation provided by the virtual machine monitor ensures that the
user OS is not able to access the backup volume1 . To simplify the notations, I use VM1
for the user operating system, and VM2 for the tiny OS for backup volume.
DARFR consists of two components: a detector component and a recovery component.
The detector component runs in VM1. It constantly monitors VM1 and will notify the
recovery component when ransomware is detected. The recovery component mainly
runs in VM2. It periodically pulls data from the regular volume for backup purposes.
Once having received the notification from the detector, it will work with VM1 to re1 Here

I assume the virtual machine monitor can provide a good isolation. Penetrating the barrier created by virtualization is out of our research scope.
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Figure 11: The architecture of recovery component(RDS3) used in DARFR
store the data being protected. There are a large number of detectors available in the literature [69, 87, 46, 41] that monitor either system behavior or file access patterns, which
can be simply adapted here for our detector component. To prevent the ransomware from
disturbing the detector component, I should run this component in a privilege higher than
the root privilege of VM1 (e.g., a privilege comparable to the that of the virtual machine
monitor). In the following, I will elaborate the design of the recovery component, which
is the main focus of this paper.

4.4.1

Recovery Component in RDS3

The recovery component consists of a backup application (i.e., backup app) and a recovery application (i.e., recovery app). The backup app periodically communicates with
VM1 to pull data from the regular volume, and stores them to the backup volume. The
recovery app is activated when ransomware is found and blocked. It will then work with
VM1 to read data from the backup volume, to recover the data being corrupted by the ransomware in the regular volume. Note that VM1 is not able to have direct access to the
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backup volume due to isolation enforced by the virtual machine monitor.
Since the backup volume is created using the spare space in a computing device, it will
be limited in capacity (e.g., 10%-20% of the entire storage capacity). To address this concern, I do the following: first, I allow the device owner to mark his/her “important” files;
second, when backing up the data to the backup volume, I utilize delta encoding [44] such
that only the difference between two subsequent versions is transmitted and stored. I will
elaborate the key functionality of the recovery component, namely, initialization, marker
generation, back up data, and data recovery.
Here users file are automatically backed up to the backup machine with time interval t.
Since backup virtual machine has been allocated remaining free space in the system it
is useless to backup whole file system. Our system has provision to mark the file as important and not important. I take the help of extended attributes to mark them.But, the
marking should not be distinguishable. So, I have designed a program which can mark the
file as important with encrypted attributes. The encryption is done by asymmetric cryptographic algorithm (e.g. RSA) with a public key from the backup machine. Only the
backup machine would know whether the file is important or not. Users can set the flag
on an off depending upon their requirements.
By default in Unix based systems, there are not any attributes set for file. I can enforce
this to have default encrypted and encoded file attributes. Initialization. A key pair (pk, sk)
is generated for asymmetric encryption by running (pk, sk) ← KGen(λ ), where λ is a secure parameter. The public key pk is distributed to VM1, and the private key sk is kept
secret in VM2. The device owner picks a credential and keeps it in a secure location.
Marker generation. I allow the device owner to mark the files as “important.” These files
will be periodically pulled by the backup app to store in the backup volume. To generate
the marker, I face two challenges: 1) where to store the marker; 2) how to keep the marker
secret from the ransomware. By observing that most file systems maintain a set of attributes for each file, I address the first challenge by storing the marker information as one
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Figure 12: RDS3 flow
additional file attribute. If the file is an “important” file, I simply set the marker as “1”.
Otherwise, the marker is “0”. To address the second challenge, I encrypt the marker using asymmetric encryption. This is necessary, as the marker is generated in VM1. Using
symmetric encryption in VM1 may create a risk of key leakage, since we cannot predict
when the ransomware is present. Using asymmetric encryption only requires the public
key to be present during encryption which will mitigate the aforementioned risk. In addition, to prevent the ransomware from learning that two different files have the same mark,
I embed the file ID into the encryption. A marker attribute for file f1 will be computed as:
AEnc pk (marker f or f1 || f ile ID f or f1 ||nonce). To ensure that the file ID is unique for
each file, it can be generated by concatenating the ID of the computing device and the file
name.The nonce is a large enough random number generated each time when computing
a marker attribute.
The detailed process for marker generation is shown in Algorithm 1. In this algorithm,
the marker is first encrypted into a ciphertext, which will be encoded using base64 (i.e.,
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Base64Encode). This is to ensure that the encrypted marker is in a readable format which
is good for transmission between VM1 and VM2. The encoded encrypted marker will be
set as an attribute of the corresponding file (i.e., SetFileAttribute).
Once a file is marked as important, they are pulled in a regular basis to the backup volume
by the backup program. The backup program implements delta encoding techniques to
transfer data in the form of differences. This helps to have incremental backup saving
both network usage and time. For notation purpose, the user Operating System in regular
volume is called VM1 and tiny OS in backup volume is called VM2.
Algorithm 1: Marker Generation
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:

procedure GenMarker(pk, f ile_id, marker, λ )
nonce {0, 1}λ
ciphertext ← AEnc pk (marker|| f ile_id||nonce)
attribute ← Base64Encode(ciphertext)
ret ← SetFileAttribute(attribute)
return ret
end procedure

When a file is created, the system will mark it as “0” by default. This can be achieved by
running GenMarker(pk, f ile_id, 0, λ ). In a Unix based system, inotify API provides a
mechanism to monitor filesystem events [9]. When a new file is created, inotify triggers
GenMarker to set the default marker.
Back up data. Periodically, the backup app running in VM2 will contact VM1 to pull
the data from the regular volume. VM1 keeps track of the files being modified in this period T , and the corresponding encrypted markers and file IDs will be pulled by the backup
app. The backup app will then decrypt all the markers using the private key, and identify those “important” files which have been changed. It then requests VM1 to send back
those files. To save both communication and storage, the backup can be performed in an
incremental manner. Specifically, only the difference (i.e., delta) between two file versions will be transmitted and stored.
The detailed backup process is shown in Algorithm 2. In this algorithm, the backup app
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first pulls the attributes from VM1 for those files which have been changed in this period
(i.e., PullAttributes). For each file, the backup app obtains the “marker” attribute (i.e.,
GetFileAttribute), decodes it using base64 (i.e., Base64Decode), which is then decrypted
using the private key sk. By removing the file ID, I can simply obtain the marker, which
determines whether we should back up the corresponding file or not.
Algorithm 2: Back Up Data
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:

procedure BackUp(Host, sk)
S ←PullAttributes(Host)
for ∀s ∈ S do
attribute ← GetFileAttribute(s)
ciphertext ← Base64Decode(attribute)
plaintext ← ADecsk (ciphertext)
obtain marker from plaintext
if marker then
pull this file from regular volume using delta encoding
end if
end for
return true
end procedure

DARFR exploits the isolation technique with backup technique. The backup technique
is very unique which provides secret based incremental backup strategy. As shown in
Figure 13 VM1 is a regular computer which runs operating system with all applications
and stores data. VM2 is a very light weight machine acts as backup. It uses secret key
based on public-key cryptography to make backup from VM1. The idea of using secret
is to thwart ransomware to corrupt our backup. Recent ransomware research works have
been performed based on ransomware get least-privilege access to the system. I must not
make this assumption. What if ransomware gets administrative access to the system?.
Ransomware might be able to disable the running ransomware detection applications in
the system. Our DARFR is resistant to this situation. Because I have an unknown secret
stored in VM2 which is not accessable to ransomware which is protected by isolation.
Once file is marked as important, they are pulled in a regular basis to the backup volume
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by the backup software. The backup software implements delta encoding techniques to
transfer data in the form of differences. This helps to have incremental backup saving
both network usage and time.
Data recovery. Once the detector component has detected and blocked a piece of ransomware, it will inform the recovery app running in VM2. This process usually requires
the involvement of the device owner. Specifically, the data owner needs to provide the
credential (e.g., a secret password) in VM1 which is used to pass the authentication of
VM2.
After the VM1 successfully passes the authentication, the recovery app will check the
backup volume to see whether a corrupted file has been backed up previously. If a backup
copy is found, the recovery app will reconstruct this copy (this usually requires starting
from the initial file version, and applying all the subsequent deltas [44]), and send it back
to VM1. Otherwise, if corrupted file do not belong to the “important” files being protected, no recovery action will be performed. After the recovery is done, the credential
should be completely removed from VM1. All important files of VM1 are replicated to
VM2. If VM1 is attacked by crypto-ransomware, recovery program executes and apply
the backup stored in backup volume on VM2.
The backup program communicates with the regular volume through ssh protocol using
asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. The regular volume should not be able to access the
content of backup volume, but the backup volume has all privileges the regular machine.
Hence, the backup volumes must pull the important data from the regular user machine.
This is very minimal and lightweight system. In addition, it would contain applications
that are required to run other isolated environment. For example, the host machine can be
minimal Ubuntu server with KVM hypervisior installed on the top of it. The host machine
is very minimal and no application runs on it. Hence, it is assumed to be secure.
The regular machine is a user machine where all the applications required for the user
have been installed. When the system boots the user is presented with regular machine
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Figure 13: The interaction between VM1 and VM2 in the recovery component

VM1 hiding the hosts machine.
This machine (VM2) runs in the background and is very minimal in order to run the backup
software only. The isolation techniques provided by the virtualization enforces safeguarding the data. The backup machine would utilize the free remaining in the system.
Regular volume is a filesystem laid out in the partition of hard drive. It starts with Boot
Block and number of Block groups. The number of Block groups is directly proportional
to the size of the storage available in the host machine. The Figure 14 shows the layout of
the volume. I use the two volumes: Regular volume and Backup volume. Regular volume
is the user space volume where user operating system and applications are installed. Not
all files in this volume are important and necessary to store in the backup volume. It is
necessary to make full backup of the regular volume to the backup volume. These two
volumes are isolated using Virtual Machine Monitor(VMM). So we can recover all files
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when ransomware encrypt all files in the regular volume. But this is impractical due to
requirements of external resources and services. In addition, this could be costly as well.
I use the isolation to separate storage volume. Storage volume is separated into two types:
backup volume, regular volume. VM2 stores the backup volume which is isolated from
all running applications in VM1. Hence, DARFR stores the redundant data in isolated volume achieving security using Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) which provides isolation,
and once the ransomware is detected it can be recovered from the backup volume.
In order to mark the file as important or not, I propose a new method of attribute-based
marking technique called setflags. I can utilize the concept of extended attributes available in Unix based system. I can use setfattr [18] to set the extended file attributes such
as user.comment="important". This plain form of marking is easily noticeable and can
be regarded as vulnerable since any one identify the crucial file by listing the extended
attribute. The best approach would be to encrypt the flags strings in our example "important". But this will be same for all important files. In order to make the marking unique
for each file, I take advantage of inode as shown in Figure 14.
However, in order to save the data space and resources the user can backup only those
files that are important. To mark a file as important or not such that malware couldn’t find
which file is important or not is a very challenging task. One way is to set mark in file’s
extended attribute such that 1 indicate important and 0 indicate not important though this
binary marking has several disadvantages. First, intelligent ransomware can easily guess
as there are only two differentiations. Second, binary marking doesn’t set an unique mark
to each file. So, in order to mark a file uniquely Inode number can be used and mark is
generated by appending 0 or 1 at the end of it. The whole string is later encrypted by using the public key generated by the tiny OS in the backup volume. Since, encrypted string
are not readable I encoded the string with base64 encoding technique and set it to a file.
As an example, the following Figure 15 indicates the file marked as important. The operating system and regular applications are installed in regular volume. All files are not
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Figure 14: Volume Layout and I-node Structure
important in the volume.
Inode is a data structure in Unix base file system which holds all the metadata about a file.

As shown in Figure 14, I-node structure contains meta-information for file.
This is the user space volume where user operating system and applications are installed.
Not all files in this volume are important. To mitigate the effect of ransomware all the
filesystem must be back up to the secure place. However, this is impractical due to requirements of external resources and services. It could be costly as well. However, in
order to save the data space and resources user can backup only those files that are important. To mark a file as important or not such that malware couldn’t find which file is
important or not is a very challenging task. One way is to set mark in file’s extended attribute such that 1 indicate important and 0 indicate not important. But, this binary marking has several disadvantages. First, one disadvantage is intelligent ransomware can easily
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guess as there are only two differentiation. Second, binary marking doesn’t set an unique
mark to each file. So, in order to mark a file uniquely I-node number can be used and
mark is generated by appending 0 or 1 at the end of it. The whole string is later encrypted
by using the public key generated in the tiny OS in the backup volume. Since the output of the encryption algorithm is binary data, it is not readable. I apply base64 encoding
scheme to encode the binary string and assign value to the extended attribute which is
<key, value> pair. The following Figure 15 depicts the file marker which is unique to all
important files.

Figure 15: File Attribute Encryption

4.5

Security Analysis for DARFR

DARFR defends against ransomware by periodically backing up data. However, since
I cannot predict when ransomware is present to corrupt the data, it will be possible that
ransomware will corrupt the data which have not been backed up. I analyze this security
leakage in the following.
Let t1 be the point of time ransomware is present and starts to encrypt the data, and t2 be
the point of time the ransomware is detected and blocked. Let t ′ be the point of time before t1 upon the latest back up process is performed. Recall that T is the time interval for
invoking a backup process. I have two cases:
1) The “important” data created at or before t ′ are always recoverable since they have
already been backed up; 2) The “important data” created between t ′ and t2 may be corrupted by ransomware.
For case 2), I first quantify this vulnerable period (I call it vulnerable window here). The
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vulnerable window can be computed as: t2 − t ′ . As t ′ is the point of time before t1 when
the latest back up process was performed, I have: t ′ + T > t1 , i.e., t ′ > t1 − T .
Thus, t2 − t ′ < t2 − (t1 − T ) = (t2 − t1 ) + T .
If there exists an effective detector which can detect ransomware within T , then t2 − t1 <
T.
In this case, t2 − t ′ < (t2 − t1 ) + T < T + T = 2 · T . If T is chosen as a few minutes, then
this vulnerable window will be also a few minutes. We further understand how the ransomware will affect the “important” data during the aforementioned vulnerable window.
Let δ be the amount of “important” data being generated in this vulnerable window, and
G be the total amount of data in the regular volume. Assume the ransomware can encrypt
x bits of data per second, then:
The amount of data being encrypted by the ransomware is: (t2 − t1 ) · x.
As the ransomware has no knowledge of which data are “important,” it can only corrupt
data in a random (uniformly random) manner. Thus, the amount of “important” data encrypted by ransomware will be:
δ
(t2 − t1 ) · x · G
.

For example, if the detector can detect ransomware in 120 seconds, and ransomware can
encrypt 100MB/s; the amount of “important” data generated during the vulnerable window is 100MB; the total amount of data in the regular volume is 500GB, then the amount
of “important” data encrypted by ransomware will be 2.4MB, which is 2.4% of the entire
newly generated “important” data.
Let us consider a time stamp t1 and a file state f1. I need to consider several cases for secure recovery of file f1.
Case1: Ransomware infects the machines and is detected before the backup machine
pulls the data.
The File f1 is marked as important by the user by setting the imp flag. Both regular machine and backup machine contains the exact replica of the file. If at time t2 ransomware
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encrypts the file f1 as f1.enc and delete the original file. I have a secure copy of the original file f1 on backup machine. In another sub case if f1 is not marked as important but
encrypted by the ransomware, there is not secure replica of f1 in backup machine and no
worth to recover it.
Case2: Ransomware infects the machine and is detected after the backup machine pulls
the data. This may leads to two sub cases as in the first case. If the imp flag is not set in
the attribute then we are safe since all our important data are located in the backup copy.
On the other hand if the ransomware encrypts the file with imp flag set it may happen
with very minimal probability that the backup program pull the encrypted data and overwrite the original data.

4.6

Important Consideration

Isolation provided by a virtual machine monitor: RDS3 relies on the isolation provided by a virtual machine monitor to prevent the ransomware from accessing the backup
volume. Although a few existing works [102, 108] investigated the vulnerabilities of virtualization, most of them are focusing on stealing information from a co-resident virtual
machine, which are more concerned with attacking read operations. Our objective in
RDS3, however, is to prevent the attacker from writing the co-resident virtual machine,
which is more concerned with write operations. Security of RDS3 depends upon the security provided by the isolation. I assume that Ransowmare can’t detect the presence of
virtualisation or exploit the hypervisor. I evaluated our work using software based isolation technique exploiting virtualisation techniques such as KVM, XEN, Docker, and VirtualBox. I have isolated the system and the communication between two system is done
through the secure key based ssh connection. Hence, only the backup machine is able to
communicate with the regular machine. Users install all user applications in the user machine and hence hosts machine is completely isolated and remain intact, the RDS3 system
is capable of recovering users valuable data depending upon the backup frequency and
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Figure 16: Disk usage statistics in our survey. The bar for “x% free space” shows the percentage of subjects who have at least x% free space

speed of detection engine. In RDS3 backup frequency can be setup by the user. If user set
the backup frequency very low it consequently increases the vulnerability window of data
loss. On the other hand, increasing the backup frequency leads to minimize the vulnerability window of data loss.
About the “spare space” assumption: RDS3 relies on the assumption that the computing device is equipped with a certain amount of spare space (see Section 4.2), which
can be utilized to create the backup volume. To justify this assumption in practice, I conducted a survey in our institute. I selected a group of 104 students, and obtained the storage usage in their personal computers. The statistical results are shown in Figure 16. The
results show that most of the computing devices (80%-90%) have more than 20% spare
space. This confirms the practicality of RDS3.
Computing delta: During the back up process, the backup app needs to compute the difference (i.e., delta) between the file version stored in the backup volume and that stored
in the regular volume. Rolling checksum [98] can be utilized to efficiently identify the
difference of the two files stored in different machines. In addition, to reduce the storage
cost for the backup data, we can periodically perform an in-place reconstruction on the
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backup volume, to obtain a new starting-version for each file.
Operation suggestion: To ensure the ransomware will not hack into the tiny OS for the
backup volume, I recommend the device owner should not enter the tiny OS. By default,
the device should directly boot into the user OS for daily use. The tiny OS can be activated by the virtual machine monitor whenever a backup process or data recovery process
is needed.
Hardware-based isolation: Besides using isolation provided by software like virtual
machine monitor, RDS3 may also obtain isolation support from secure hardware like Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone. This however, may limit the applications of RDS3, as it
requires the computing device to be equipped with certain secure hardware. At present,
only a few computing devices (e.g., servers, desktops, and laptops) are equipped with Intel SGX. ARM TrustZone more likely appears in a computing device equipped with limited resources (e.g., smart phones), which is not our focus in this work (see Section 4.2).
Intel computer architecture supports a set of extensions to provide confidentiality and integrity to security-aware computation performed on a computer. This extension is known
as Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [67] which assures integrity and confidentiality even all the privilege software (kernel, hypervisior, etc) is potentially malicious.
Intel SGX extension consists of two collections of instruction extensions: SGX1, SGX2.
The SGX1 extensions support instructions which are used to create an hardware-level
isolated containers which is referred to as an enclave. The SGX2 extensions allow runtime management of enclave resources and thread execution within an enclave. Similarly, TrustZone [58] is also security extensions added to ARMv6 processors and greater,
such as ARM11, CoretxA families. This extension provides isolation by creating operating worlds: Normal World, Secure World at the same time from a single core. There
is a strong mechanism placed to control switching between these modes: monitor mode.
These two worlds are used to provide isolation.
Mitigating the “marking” attack: Marking a file as “important” only relies on the pub42

lic key, which is also known to the ransomware who can obtain root privilege. Therefore,
the ransomware may disturb the system by marking all the files as “important.” I claim
this is not a major issue, because: first, the recovery component of RDS3 is actually a version control system which uses an incremental backup technique. The version control
system can ensure that no data will be lost. Second, RDS3 incorporates a detector component which can detect and block ransomware within a reasonable amount of time. Thus,
to perform the aforementioned attack, the ransomware needs to mark a large number of
files as “important” in a short time, and such abnormal behavior can be easily detected by
the detector component running in VM1.

4.7

Details Implementation of RDS3

I implemented a prototype for RDS3 by tailoring Linux as the operating system. I implemented various components in RDS3: initialization, marker generation, back up data,
and data recovery in c. The implementation details are elaborated below. Marker generation algorithm monitors the filesystem activities using inotify component of the Linux
kernel. Inotify is used to keep track of the creation of new file in regular volume. Newly
created file has unique identifier which is accessible via i-node structure. This unique
identifier is concatenated with boolean marker which gives unique identifier. I need to
keep this information secret from ransomware program. To provide security of this sensitive information, I use OpenSSL library to encrypt the unique identifier. The unique
identifier is encrypted using public key. The output of encryption algorithm is not suitable for extended attribute. So I encoded the output of encryption using base64 encoding
mechanism. The output of encoding function is used to set the value of the extended attribute which is marker. So marker attribute is secure from ransomware even ransomware
gets system or administrative privilege in VM1. I-node number is access from i-node data
structure which can be access from glibc standard library.
Initialization. The asymmetric encryption is instantiated using RSA with 1024-bit key
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size, i.e. λ = 1024. The key pair (pk, sk) is generated using OpenSSL cryptographic library.
Marker generation. Marker generation is performed in VM1. I use ‘1’ and ‘0’ as the
marker to distinguish “important” and “not important” file, respectively. I concatenate
marker, file ID, and nonce (randomly generated during run time), and encrypt them using
RSA asymmetric encryption. The resulting cipher is further encoded using base64 encoding2 , generating the corresponding file attribute. The attribute is further affiliated with
the corresponding file by running setfattr [18]. By default, when a new file is created, it
will be set with an attribute being computed using marker “0”. The inotify API is used to
monitor the changes of the file system which can detect a file creation event.
Back up data. I implemented a backup app by leveraging rsync as described in Algorithm 2. Backup is a technique I used to make backup of regular volume in VM1. However, taking whole backup of the regular volume poses difficulties: storage cost, backup
time, impossible to distinguish important and not important files. Our approach to solve
these difficulties is as follows: delta-encoding, incremental backup, and minimum corruption window. Our ideal application to perform these requirements is by leveraging
rsync application. I introduced corruption window, which is data loss delta time. This
parameter is configurable according to requirement which depends upon the number of
critical files in the regular volume. Periodically, the backup app running in VM2 will read
from the regular volume (over ssh) and decrypt the marker attributes of all the files using
the private key. Next the backup app execute a program called FindAttr located in VM2
remotely over ssh in VM1 and only pull the files and their associated attributes. The encrypted attributes are decrypted using the private key located in VM2. After decryption,
the backup program will take only those file which attributes are set as important by considering the last bits. Important files consists of 1 appended to their attributes. only backs
up those files marked as “important” in an incremental manner using rsync (over ssh). If a
2 Base64

encoding is used to facilitate storing and transmission of this attribute.
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user marks a large number of files as “important,” there may be insufficient storage space
in the backup volume. Therefore, the backup app also incorporates quota and notification
functionality to inform the user about the space insufficiency.
Data recovery. In addition, I have implemented a recovery app which runs in VM2 and
can be used by the victim to restore the data corrupted by the ransomware, using the data
stored in the backup volume. Those corrupted files can be reconstructed in VM2 and then
pushed back to the regular volume (over ssh), over writing their corrupted versions.
Recovery component of DARFR which is executed after ransomware attack on VM1. Before running Recovery program in VM2, the installed ransomware needs to be completely
removed from VM1. After removing ransomware completely lunch Recovery program
in VM2. Recovery program uses delta-encoding scheme to apply backup in VM1. For
instance, backup set of files Fs = f1 , f2 , ..., fs . I use Recovery program which compares
checksum of files in backup volume on VM2 with files regular volume on VM1. Recovery program detects mismatching checksum for set of files, Fs . Hence, it apply the backup
to corresponding Fs in regular volume in VM1.

4.8

Experimental Evaluation

I set up a test-bed for our experimental evaluation, using the following system configurations: Our host machine was equipped with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU X5550 @ 2.67GHz,
6GB RAM, and 1.8 TB disk space. Two VMMs (XEN and VirtualBox) were installed
in the host machine running Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS. Two virtual machines VM1 and VM2
were created under each VMM, respectively, each was assigned 1 core CPU, 1GB RAM,
and 100GB hard disk space. I used a benchmarking tool fio[4] to evaluate the throughput.
I compared DARFR using different VMMs. I also collected the throughput of the host
physical machine without running DARFR.
I evaluated the throughput in terms of sequential read (i.e., SREAD), random read (i.e.,
RANREAD), sequential write (i.e., SWRITE), and random write (i.e., RANWRITE). The
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Table 3: Throughput of DARFR in VM1 Under Different VMMs
Machine

SREAD

RANREAD SWRITE RANWRITE

no DARFR

53.9MB/s

815KB/s

146MB/s

749KB/s

Docker

51.9MB/s

810KB/s

113MB/s

760KB/s

XEN

31.6MB/s

806KB/s

97.2MB/s

732KB/s

VirtualBox 22.7MB/s

712KB/s

50.9MB/s

756KB/s

experimental results are shown in Table 3. I observed that the additional overhead introduced by DARFR varies 41%-58% for sequential read, and 30%-65% for sequential write.
The additional overhead mainly comes from the virtualization for isolation and computation required for backing up data. I did not observe significant additional overhead for
random read and random write. The potential reason is, due to the internal implementation of virtualization, the random read/write may be not exactly equivalent to that in a
physical machine. Specifically, the VMM may optimize the random seek issued from the
upper layer. In addition, I observed that DARFR running in XEN achieved better performance compared to running in VirtualBox. This indicates that XEN is optimized more in
performance than VirtualBox. In conclusion, Docker performs more effectively than XEN
and VirtualBox.
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5

CryptoRansomware Detection Using Multi-Level Mining, Reverse Engineering and Static Analysis

Ransomware became a major concern of many sectors who have adopted cyber-enabled
technologies for their businesses and services. These businesses follow well-regulated
guidelines before moving to the internet-based business offerings. New kinds of malware
called ransomware disrupt these businesses through extortion. In this research, I investigated a large number of ransomware samples in order to identify a some pattern which
can be identified as the hallmark of such malware for detection purposes. I designed and
implemented a framework CRSTATIC (Crypto-Ransomware STATIC) which incorporates
reverse engineering, static analysis, and dynamic analysis components. To better understand the malware intent, I used a multi-level code analysis on ransomware samples. I
used data mining techniques to find association rules at different component levels to understand the usage pattern of code segments at different levels. Our experiments showed
that multi-level analysis exhibited better detection of key components in particular, encryption phase, C&C phase, and file operations. I used an integrated approach which
combines static analysis (incorporating a data-mining technique) and run-time analysis
to correlate code segments with dynamic behavior of ransomware.

I developed a unique approach which performed static analysis of ransomware at three
different levels: Assembly, Library, and Function calls. These three levels are able to capture ransomware behaviors in-terms of equivalent assembly instructions, function calls,
and network signatures that are being used. I then applied data-mining technique to find
association among components. The detail of these three contexts is described in Section 5.1. I then ran dynamic analysis of ransomware samples to validate the evolved association rules.
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5.1

Details of The Proposed Methodology: CRSTATIC

Our approach first uses the static analysis of the code after performing reverse engineering. I designed and implemented the framework which contains reverse engineering and
static analysis components. Reverse engineering is performed at three different levels:
assembly instruction level, libraries used in PE file structure level, and function calls
used in the libraries. As shown in Figure 18, these libraries are specific to the functionality used by the ransomware. Ransomware uses a distinct set of libraries; unlike regular
applications. This unique set of libraries can be considered the signature of the cryptoransomware.

5.2

Reverse Engineering

Reverse engineering [51] is defined as the process which takes a program binary file as
input and produces the output in higher-level which is easier to understand. I leverage the
existing disassembler objdump [90] to extract the assembly instructions from the binary
files. There are two types of syntax normally used in assembly code: Intel and AT&T. I
used the Intel syntax to disassemble the binary file. The output of the disassembler is the
different codes used by the ransomware and I used the preprocessor module to generate
the frequency distribution. This frequency distribution is used to generate the vector representation of each ransomware.
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Figure 17: Binary File Life Cycle

5.3

Portable Executable (PE) Format

In the windows operating system, there are different types of binary files which follow PE
format. These binary files are executable files, dynamic link libraries, system files, activex
controls, control panels, and screen savers. All of these files have common PE structures.
The portable executable file specification is described elsewhere [84]. PE file contains
following sections as shown in Figure 18.
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Figure 18: Portable Executable (PE) File Format.

PE file contains headers and sections. Header of the PE file contains: DOS header, PE
header, optional header, data directories, and sections table. Sections contain: code, imports, and data. I designed and developed a tool to extract code segments which contain
all DLLs required to execute the PE file. I am interested in finding all such DLLs and categorizing them according to functionality based on crypto-ransomware components as
shown in Figure 1. I used objdump [86] tool available in Linux which takes a PE file as
input and returns the corresponding assembly instructions. I leveraged the objdump program which is known as assemblydumper. I performed an analysis of forty-three samples
of crypto-ransomware using assemblydumper, which performs the parsing of the output
of the objdump program and builds the frequency table of all the assembly instructions.

5.4

Static Analysis

Static analysis [93] is code analysis without running an application. I designed and implemented the CRSTATIC (Crypt-Ransomware STATIC) tool as shown in Figure 19 which
takes the binary program as input and generates the libraries used. These libraries are
DLLs from the operating system. I used data-mining techniques to create the association
rules of these DLLs used by ransomware. I performed the analysis of forty-three crypto50

ransomware samples out of four hundred fifty malwares using our CRSTATIC. The results
of this analysis is appear in Section 5.8.

Figure 19: Static Analysis of Ransomware to extract hidden features (CRSTATIC).

5.5

Association Rule Mining

Association rules are generally used to find the relationships between items. Two of the
most commonly used algorithms are Apriori and FP-Growth. The Apriori algorithm scans
databases in each iteration; a slow, time consuming process. The FP-Growth algorithm
scans [60] databases two times only and develops a tree by using the "divide and conquer"
strategy, so it is fast and effective for the static analysis of ransomware. A list of DLLs
from advanced static reverse engineering is provided as input to the FP-Growth algorithm.
It produces a list of association rules as output. These rules are used as one of the signatures to detect ransomware.
Association rules consists of two parts in the form of if(antecedent) and then(consequent)
and is represented in the form of expression such as X −→ Y which means that whenever X is true Y also tends to be true. These Boolean rules are used to find a pattern to
detect the ransomware. These association rules are used to build signatures to detect ransomware.
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5.6

Cosine Similarity

Cosine similarity measures the similarity between two non-zero vectors. The cosine similarity score is used in positive space, where the score is ranged between zero and one.
Each ransomware binary is represented in vector form. The vector is represented using
Equation 1.

v = f1 x1 + f2 x2 + ... + fn xn

(1)

Where f represents the frequency of the x instruction.

5.7

Malware Samples and Experiments

I have implemented a prototype CRSTATIC, which takes input as a PE binary file. The
output of the CRSTATIC is further processed by a pre-processor module before applying a data-mining technique. CRSTATIC is implemented using C++ in a GCC compiler.
I set up a test-bed for our experimental evaluation using the following system configuration: Intel(R) Xenon(R) CPU X5550@2.67GHz, 6GB RAM, and 1.8 TB disk space. Our
prototype implementation CRSTATIC is evaluated using following configuration and the
dataset mentioned below.
I have collected four-hundred fifty malware samples from different sources, such as Virus
Total, virushare, and from different research projects such as Shieldfs [46] and open source
malware repository theZoo [21].
I performed the initial scanning of the malware carried out using RESTful API exposed
by VirusTotal [96]. RESTful API takes two parameters: apikey and resource. The apikey
is specific to the user account and resource is the hash value of the malware. However,
RESTful API allows four requests to be made per minute. I used time module from Python
to limit the four requests per minute. The response from VirusTotal [96] contains results
after scanning the provided resource by using various anti-virus engines. Based on these
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results, I have categorized crytpo-ransomware as shown in Table 9.

5.8

Analysis of Results

Table 1 shows different ransomware families based on the following attributes: Propagation Strategy, Date Appeared, Cryptographic Techniques, and Command and Control Server. These attributes are crucial and useful to in-place multi-layer defense strategies against ransomware attacks. The propagation strategy is the initial phase of the ransomware attack. It defines how ransomware attack leverages a range of possibilities including social engineering to specific vulnerability present in unpatched software installed
in the target host to get access. For example, there are eight different propagation strategies as shown in the second column in Table 1. Compromised websites and email attachment are the most frequently used propagation strategy. Propagation strategies provide
what types of measures should be implemented to reduce the risk of the ransomware attacks which includes security awareness training, secure coding practice, secure software
development life cycle, penetration testing etc. In addition, incident response team must
be vigilant for further analysis of suspicious email attachments, compromised web site
visits, emails, unpatched applications etc. The third column, which is entitled date appeared, shows the year when ransomware becomes wild. The fourth column shows the
cryptographic techniques used by the ransomware to encrypt the target data. The cryptographic techniques used by the ransomware is a very crucial attribute to determine
whether it is possible to decrypt data without paying the ransom. At a very high level,
there are two approaches used by ransomware: asymmetric and symmetric algorithms.
RSA is the commonly used asymmetric algorithm among most of the ransomware families. Similarly, AES is the commonly used symmetric algorithm are used in different families of ransomware which plays a key role to determine whether data can be decrypted
without a key or not. For example, electronic code book (ECB) mode is leaks information
regarding messages [85]. The following sections describe our approach in detail. These
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approaches are: Cosine Similarity Analysis of Assembly Code, DLLs loaded in cryptoransomware, and Function calls specific to crypto-ransomware.

5.9

Cosine Similarity Analysis of Assembly Code

Our dataset contains PE files which are the binary file formats used in the windows operating system. These PE files contain different sections as mentioned in Section 5.1. Our
focus is in the code section of the PE file. I extracted corresponding assembly code from
the code sections and calculated the frequency distribution of instructions. I have leveraged a built-in program in Linux: objdump. There are different types of assembly languages: Intel, ARM, and MIPS. I have used Intel format for cosine-similarity analysis.

5.10 DLLs Loaded in Crypto-Ransomware
Multiple libraries are required to be loaded before any ransomware can be executed in the
victim’s Operating System. These libraries are called dynamic link libraries (DLLs) [65].
Ransomware uses a number of DLLs to provide the functionality such as connecting to
the command and control server, generating the key, encrypting the files and destroying
the key etc. The operating system loader is responsible to execute the ransomware binaries and maps the address of DLLs used in the ransomware binary to memory.
In order to extract the DLLs used by the ransomware binary, I leveraged the pe-parse [12]
which extracts the DLLs from the section header of the ransomware binary (PE file).
Multiple DLLs specific to cryptography function calls are extracted as shown in Table 4.
These DLLs are used to represent a ransomware binary in vector representation. Association rules based on FP-growth are applied to generate the list of rules as shown in Table
6. Table 7 shows a small portion of the association rules set I generated by applying our
CRSTATIC tool. These rule sets are used as a signature to detect the ransomware family.
In particular, the first row shows that if COMCTL32.DLL, SHELL32.DLL, USER32.DLL
implies KERNEL32.DLL. Similarly, ninth row shows MPR.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, SHELL32.DLL,
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Table 4: Function Calls in DLLs Used in Ransomware
Name of DLL
ADVAPI32

CRYPT32

CRYPTNET
CRYPTUI

Functions
CryptReleaseContext
CryptAcquireContextA
CryptGenRandom
CryptEncrypt
CryptGetKeyParam
CryptAcquireContextW
CryptDestroyKey
CryptCreateHash
CryptHashData
CryptDestroyHash
CryptGetHashParam
CryptReleaseContext
CryptSetKeyParam
CryptImportKey
CryptQueryObject
CertFreeCertificateContext
CertFindCertificateInStore
CryptMsgGetParam
CryptDecodeObjectEx
CryptImportPublicKeyInfo
CryptBinaryToStringA
CryptStringToBinaryA
CertGetNameStringW
CertCloseStore
CertFreeCertificateContext
CryptGetObjectUrl
CryptUIDlgSelectCertificateFromStore

USER32.DLL implies again KERNEL32.DLL which also has DLL specific to cryptoransomware as shown in Table 4. The last row shows OLE32.DLL, SHELL32.DLL, KERNEL32.DLL, USER32.DLL implies ADVAPI32.DLL. If any unknown binary file matches
60 percent of these rule sets it is categorized as a ransomware with an accuracy of 70
percent. Table 4 shows the list of DLLs used by the crypto-ransomware and the list of
function calls used by the corresponding DLLs. For example, DLL library ADVAPI32 has
fourteen function calls which perform the encryption operation. Similarly, CRYPT32 DLL
library is used by the ransomware to carried out the encryption function as well.
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5.11 Function Calls Specific to Crypto-Ransomware
As shown in Table 4, these are the functions used by crypto-ransomware samples. As
shown in Figure 1, crypto-ransomware components include: encryption key generation,
encrypt files, destroy key. The CRSTATIC tool builds the signature database using these
function calls. In the next section, the details of the CRDETECTOR presented which is
the extension of CRSTATIC.

5.11.1

Extension of CRSTATIC: CRDETECTOR

I proposed a crypto-ransowmare detection framework as shown in Figure 20. I analyzed
the ransomware binary using reverse engineering, static analysis, dynamic analysis, and
data mining methods. I designed and developed a reverse engineering module to extract
code segments which contain all DLLs required to execute the PE file. I want to find all
such DLLs and categorize them according to functionality based on crypto-ransomware
components as shown in Figure 1.
I used the object-code dump tool available in Linux which takes PE file as input and returns the corresponding assembly instructions. I leveraged the objdump program which
is known as assemblydumper. I performed the analysis of forty-three samples of cryptoransomware using assemblydumper which performs the parsing of the output of the objdump program and builds the frequency table of all the assembly instructions.
I applied reverse engineering based on assembly instruction level, libraries used in PE file
structure level, and function calls used in the libraries. I performed the static analysis of
the code generated in different intermediate levels (e.g. function call level, libraries level,
and assembly level) after performing reverse engineering [51]. As shown in Figure 18,
these libraries are specific to the functionality used by the ransomware. Ransomware uses
a distinct set of libraries in different code segments at distinct levels, unlike regular applications. The dynamic analysis is performed by leveraging the memory forensic framework. This unique set of code segments can be considered the signature of the crypto56

ransomware.
I designed and implemented the CRDETECTOR ( Crypto-Ransomware DETECTOR )
tool as shown in Figure 20 which takes the binary program as input and generates the
libraries used. These libraries are DLLs from the operating system. I used data-mining
techniques to create the association rules of these DLLs used by ransomware. I performed
the analysis of thirty-five crypto-ransomware samples out of four hundred forty malwares
using our CRDETECTOR. The results of this analysis is shown in Section 5.16.2.

Figure 20: Overall Diagram of proposed crypto-ransomware detection (CRDETECTOR)
using Reverse Engineering, Static Analysis, and Dynamic Analysis along with Datamining Approach.

5.11.2

Multi-Level Code Segment Analysis

I performed the multi-level code segment analysis of the ransomware binary in fourdifferent levels: function call, library, assembly, and binary.
• Function Call: Function call analysis is performed by using Function calls Extractor as shown in Figure 20. Function call level analysis shows the function used
to perform cryptographic operation. For example, this association rule CryptCre57

ateHash, CryptHashData, CryptGetHashParam => CryptDestroyHash shows the
functions pattern used in Locky ransomware.

• Library: Library call analysis shows the library used in ransomware binary. These
libraries are used to implement the function calls in function call level. There are
number of association rules that are build as shown in Table 7. For instance, [KERNEL32, USER32, GDI32, SHELL32, WININET] => [ADVAPI32] this pattern capture the libraries used in Locky ransomware.

• Assembly: Assembly level analysis shows the assembly instructions used to perform the equivalent function. The following code segment shows the assembly level
code used to encrypt the user data. Figure 21 shows third, fourth, fifth and sixth
lines from bottom are calling the Locky function to lock the users data.

Figure 21: Assembly Level Code Segment of Locky Ransomware Sample.

• Binary: The binary level analysis is performed by calculating the one-way hash
value. The sha256sum is used to compute the pattern in binary level. For instance,
the binary level pattern for Locky ransomware is a3b83d6d7a56844f6c6a36217
63e9558c24aaf032ee9c40cfb3158ac1d91348c.
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5.11.3

Association Rules Mining

In this section I describe the unsupervised data mining technique called Association rule
mining. Association rules are used in machine learning to find out the interesting relations between variables in a large data sets. Association rules are used to find the pattern
(sub-sequence or substructure of a set of items that occur together). Pattern represents intrinsic and important properties of large data set and is very useful in business to make a
decision. Formally an association rule is an implication of the form X → Y [30]. Where
X= {x1 , x2 , ......, xn } and Y={y1 , y2 , ......, yn } are the set of distinct items in a transaction
T. The X is commonly known as antecedent and Y as consequent. The association rules
simply says that whenever there is possibility of happening event X there is also likely
to happen event Y as well. Ransomware samples are processed by using DLLs Extractor and represented in the list of used DLLs. For example consider an association rule
{SHELL32} → {KERNEL32}. It is revealed that ransomware using SHELL32 often
also used KERNEL32 library. Another example of association rules could be {SHELL32,
KERNEL32,USER32} → {ADVAPI32}. It means ransomwares that use these three libraries typically also use ADVAPI32. In order to formulate the rules for association the
notion of support and confidence are used. Support and confidence are used to measure
the strength of the rule. The quality measure of the association rules are represented by
three terms: Support, Confidence and Lift.
Support is a fraction of transaction that contains both item sets X and Y. It determines
how frequent a rule is applicable to a given data set. Formally support for association rule
X → Y is support(X → Y ) =

σ (X∪Y )
N

Where N is the number of instances and σ (X ∪Y )

is the number of instances covering both X and Y[94].The idea is to take the number
of items that cover both X and Y and divide that by the total number of instances in the
database under consideration.
Confidence measures how often items in Y appear in transaction that contain X. Formally
confidence can be defined as confidence(X → Y ) =
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σ (X∪Y )
σ (X) [94].

Lift The third quality metric used in the association rule is lift. The association rule X →
Y is interesting with high support and confidence but sometimes it tends to become misleading and give false positives. In such cases correlation between X and Y is considered
and is called lift. Three types of correlations is considered from the lift value.
• Positively correlated when lift(X → Y ) >1
• Negatively correlated when lift(X → Y ) <1
• X and Y are independent if lift is nearly equal to 1.
Support, confidence and lift can be expressed in terms of probability.
support(X → Y ) = P(X ∪Y )
confidence(X → Y ) = P(Y |X)
lift(X → Y ) =

P(X ∪Y )
P(X)P(Y )

Support, s is the probability that a transaction contains σ (X ∪Y ) and Confidence, c is
the conditional probability that a transaction containing X also contains Y[59]. I have
counted the number on instances which covers both X and Y, and divide that by the number of instances covering just X. Both support and confidence have their own significance.
Confidence indicates the strength of the rules however support has a statistical significance. Higher the confidence more strength the rule is. Another motivation for support it
to suppress the rules that are minimum threshold for business reasons. In order to formulate the meaningful rules and pattern optimum value of minimum support (minsup) and
minimum confidence (minconf) are chosen. Both minsup and minconf varies within the
range of 0 to 1 [31]. In association rule mining I found all the rules, X → Y with minimum support and confidence.
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5.11.4

Scalable Mining Methods

There are three major approaches in mining Level-wise, Join-based approach: Apriori
[32], Vertical data format approach: Eclat[107] and Frequent pattern projection and growth:
FP-Growth[61]. In this research I have used FP-Growth technique because it is more efficient for and has less memory usage and less run time. Its more scalable and can be used
in distributed system[80].
5.11.5

Hierarchical Analysis of Malware Samples

The common problem in normal association rule mining is the generation of large number
of rules from the databases. The large volume of such rules make it difficult to analyze
and make the use of the rules. Hence, Hierarchical association rule mining is used. Hierarchical analysis of binary PE file can be presented as shown in Figure 22.

Figure 22: Hierarchical Analysis of Ransomware Samples
In hierarchical association items often form the hierarchy. In our case the first level of
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hierarchy is formed by the assembly, DLLs and function calls. In the next level their types
and frequencies appears.

5.11.6

Memory Forensic For Run-time Analysis

Dynamic analysis [47] of the program is performed to capture the run-time behavior and
provides execution trace. I have performed the execution of the ransomware samples in
a sandbox environment and capture the memory snapshot of the system. The sandbox
experimental environment is setup using cuckoo sandbox[56]. The memory snapshot is
analyzed using memory forensic framework: Volatility.

5.11.7

Detection of Process Injection

The memory snapshot of the system is analyzed to detect any abnormal behavior performed in process relationship, comparing process memory, and dynamic process data
structures. Process injection is a commonly used method by malware families to execute
a arbitrary code in the address space of a running process [28]. Each process has its own
separate address space in memory while running. There are multiple techniques to injecting code into a live process. There are: Dynamic-link library injection, Portable executable injection, Thread execution hijacking, Asynchronous Procedure Call, and Thread
Local Storage. These techniques are difficult to detect by monitoring API calls and system calls. I have leveraged memory forensic techniques to detect these techniques. The
memory forensic framework Volatility [99] provides interface to develop plugin for detection. There are three approaches to detect the process injection which are parent child
process relationship, comparing the process execution block and the virtual address descriptor structure, and suspicious memory protection.
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5.11.8 CRDETECTOR Implementation

In this section, I describe the implementation details of a prototype of CRDETECTOR
framework. As shown in Figure 20, it has components: reverse engineering, static analysis and dynamic analysis using memory forensic. I elaborate on how CRDETECTOR
automatically generates code segment patterns by applying association rules in results
obtained from reverse engineering and static analysis, how the memory forensic was performed by leveraging modules available in Volatility [99], and how I deployed the prototype of our system.

5.11.9

Cosine Similarity Analysis of Assembly Code

Our dataset contains PE files which are the binary file formats used in the Windows operating system. These PE files contain different sections as mentioned in Section 5.3. My
focus is in the code section of the PE file. I extracted corresponding assembly code from
the code sections and calculated the frequency distribution of instructions. I have leveraged a built-in program in Linux: objdump. There are different types of assembly languages: Intel, ARM, and MIPS. I am using Intel format for cosine-similarity analysis. I
computed cosine similarity scores between fifteen families of crypto-ransomware samples
and plotted as shown in Figure 23 where highly similar families are by red color in heat
maps. The high similarity among the families of ransomware can be observed by their
score and colored. For example, high similarity between F7 (row) and columns F3, F5,
F6, F10, F11, F12, F13 indicate that code segment is similar at the instruction level analysis. In these experiments, the average cosine similarity score among ransomware families
is found to be 0.6125 (with standard deviation of 0.2149).
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Figure 23: Cosine Similarity between Fifteen Different Ransomware Families.

Figure 23 shows the similarity measured between normal programs and ransomware families. To measure the cosine similarities between normal binaries and ransomware, I have
considered 15 normal binaries (applications) which include putty.exe, FileZilla.exe, WinScp.exe, BitLocker.exe, and OpenSSHClient.exe among the selected normal binary files.
I computed two centroid vectors of all the ransomware families as well as normal binaries by taking the average of the vectors. These centroid vectors represent ransomware
and normal binaries in our analysis and labelled as F1, F2,..., F15 and N1, N2 ,..., N15 as
shown in heat map (Figure 24). These cosine similarity measures indicate low similarity
scores in most cases, in particular, the average cosine similarity score is 0.135 with 0.130
as the standard deviation.
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Figure 24: Cosine Similarity between Normal and Ransomware Binaries.

Furthermore, high similarity scores obtained in same class (Figure 23) and different class
pairs (Figure 24) with comparatively low similarity score support to obtain good threshold
value for similarity-based ransomware detection. These studies highlight significant differences between the normal binaries and ransomware but may not be conclusive. Next I
have conducted experiments the library level (DLLs) to better understand ransomware.
As shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24, I observe that the average similarity score for normal programs is 0.7405 and standard deviation is 0.1965. The average similarity score
across ransomware and normal binary is 0.09144 with 0.07645 standard deviation.

5.12 Libraries Used in Ransomware
Table 5 shows the different dynamic-link libraries used in the ransomware families analyzed by applying reverse engineering. I performed multiple run of the FP-growth algorithm to extract the pattern used in library level. There are seventeen different DLLs
which provide different functionalities such as cryptographic operation, low level file op65

Table 5: The list of the Libraries used by the ransomware families. These libraries are
very specific to the crypto-ransomware behavior.
L IBRARY NAME
Descriptions
USER32
Windows management functions for message handling, times, menus, and communications
KERNEL32
Low-level operating system functions for memory management and resource handling
SHELL32
Shipped with Internet Explorer, which provides the option of installing an integrated shell
ADVAPI32
Advanced Application Programming Interface (ADVAPI) provides supporting numerous APIs including many security and registry calls
COMCTL32
Common Controls library which provides interesting window controls such as progress bars and elaborate constructions such as tree views and property sheets
GDI32
Graphics Device Interface (GDI) functions for device output, such as those for drawing and font management
VERSION
The module provides APIs used for Windows version checking by the application on Windows NT
SHLWAPI
This library shipped with Internet Explorer which provides functionalities to expanded most of releases of Internet Explorer rather than of any operating system
MPR
This module provides functions used to handle communication between the Windows operating system and the installed network providers
PSAPI
Process Status API provides sets of functions for retrieving the following information: Device Driver Information, Process Information, Module Information, Process Memory Usage Information, Working Set Information, Memory-Mapped File Information
COMDLG32
Common Dialog Box Library, implements a wide variety of Windows dialog boxes intended to perform such as Open and Save as dialog boxes
WININET
Windows Internet (WinINet) application programming interface (API) enables applications to interact with HTTP, and FTP protocols to access Internet resources
MSVCRT
C Standard library for the Visual C++ (MSVC) run time
IPHLPAIP
A module containing the functions used by the Windows IP Helper API
MSVCP60
This module belongs to the Sony Home Network Library, a program that supports sharing of media files with other computers on the network
WS2_32
Implements the Winsock API, which provides TCP/IP networking functions and provides partial, broken compatibility with other network APIs
MSVCP60
Provides functionalities to perform query and manage network interfaces

eration, network connection, graphical interface etc. These libraries are extracted from the
ransomware families applying the components of CRDETECTOR: DLLs Extractor.

5.13 Assembly Instructions Used in Ransomware
Assembly instructions are intermediate level code used in the binary application. The frequency of these assembly instructions gives the some signature. I have performed the reverse engineering of the ransomware binaries at assembly level. The output of reverse
engineering process is preprocessed to get the frequency distribution of each instructions.
As shown in Table 6, these are the association rules built in assembly level. These rules
shows the relationship between assembly-level instructions. For example, xor, mov, add,
lea, or implies the imul. These assembly instructions(e.g. xor, imul) are commonly used
to perform cryptographic operations and others (e.g. mov, add, lea, or) are helper instructions.
As shown in Table 7, there are multiple association rules derived based on the libraries
used in crypto-ransomware. The first rule shows ADVAPI32.DLL, SHELL32.DLL ⇒
KERNEL32.DLL, the use of ADVAPI32.DLL and SHELL32.DLL implies the KERNEL32.DLL
and this pattern is common in crypto-ransomware. Similarly, the rule ADVAPI32.DLL,
SHELL32.DLL, USER32.DLL ⇒ KERNEL32.DLL captures the crypt-ransomware characteristics where ADVAPI32.DLL provides crypto-graphic APIs, SHELL32.DLL offers
shell command, USER32.DLL provides core functionality for user interfaces, and KERNEL32.DLL provides low-level APIs for file handling. As shown in Figure 25, the li66

Table 6: Association Rule On Assembly Instructions With Support=0.6

Association Rules
[imul,test,and,add,call,lea,adc,or] ⇒ [mov]
[ xor,data16,mov,and,add,call,lea,or] ⇒ [imul]
[imul,and,jmp,add,call,lea,cmp,or] ⇒ [mov]
[imul,and,jmp,add,call,lea,cmp,or] ⇒ [xor]
[imul,mov,test,add,call,adc] ⇒ [xor]
[sub,mov,test,and,jmp,adc] ⇒ [imul]
[xor,data16,mov,and,add,call,lea,or] ⇒ [imul]
[imul,test,and,add,call,lea,adc,or] ⇒ [mov]
[push,imul,test,jmp,add,call,lea] ⇒ [mov]
[sub,test,jmp,call,cmp] ⇒ [imul]
[data16,mov,and,jmp,call,lea,cmp] ⇒ [imul]
[xor,data16,imul,and,jmp,call,adc,cmp] ⇒ [lea]
[mov,test,and,jmp,add,lea,adc,cmp] ⇒ [imul]
[xor,data16,test,and,call,cmp] ⇒ [add]
[xor,mov,add,lea,or] ⇒ [imul]

Confidence
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9375
0.8
1.0
0.8
1.0
1.0
0.90
1.0
1.0
0.95
1.0
1.0

braries used by ransomware sample is extracted using mona python framework [27].

5.14 Function Calls Used in Ransomware
I have performed the function call level analysis of the crypto-ransomware. There are different function calls used as shown in Table 8.

5.15 Detecting Code Injection
The code injection is detected using dynamic analysis. It is used to capture the runtime
analysis of obfuscated program. Memory image of the system is capture using the Cuckoo
Sandbox [57]. The memory image is analyzed to extract the digital artifacts based: relationship between running processes, comparing the process execution block and the
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Table 7: Association Rule On DLLs With Support=0.6
Association Rules
[ ADVAPI32.DLL, SHELL32.DLL] ⇒ [ KERNEL32.DLL]
[ ADVAPI32.DLL, SHELL32.DLL] ⇒ [ USER32.DLL]
[ KERNEL32.DLL] ⇒ [ SHELL32.DLL]
[ KERNEL32.DLL] ⇒ [ USER32.DLL]
[ KERNEL32.DLL] ⇒ [ ADVAPI32.DLL]
[ KERNEL32.DLL, USER32.DLL] ⇒ [ SHELL32.DLL]
[ KERNEL32.DLL, USER32.DLL] ⇒ [ ADVAPI32.DLL]
[ ADVAPI32.DLL, SHELL32.DLL, KERNEL32.DLL] ⇒ [ USER32.DLL]
[ ADVAPI32.DLL, KERNEL32.DLL, USER32.DLL] ⇒ [ SHELL32.DLL]
[ SHELL32.DLL, KERNEL32.DLL, USER32.DLL] ⇒ [ ADVAPI32.DLL]
[ SHELL32.DLL, KERNEL32.DLL] ⇒ [ ADVAPI32.DLL]
[ SHELL32.DLL, USER32.DLL] ⇒ [ ADVAPI32.DLL]
[ ADVAPI32.DLL, KERNEL32.DLL] ⇒ [ SHELL32.DLL]
[ ADVAPI32.DLL, KERNEL32.DLL] ⇒ [ USER32.DLL]
[ ADVAPI32.DLL, SHELL32.DLL, USER32.DLL] ⇒ [ KERNEL32.DLL]

Confidence
1.0
1.0
0.84
1.0
0.8
0.84
0.8
1.0
0.95
0.90
0.90
0.90
0.95
1.0
1.0

Figure 25: Extracting Libraries used by Ransomware Sample
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Table 8: Function Calls In DLLs Used In Ransomware

Name of DLL
ADVAPI32

CRYPT32

CRYPTNET
CRYPTUI

Functions
CryptReleaseContext
CryptAcquireContextA
CryptGenRandom
CryptEncrypt
CryptGetKeyParam
CryptAcquireContextW
CryptDestroyKey
CryptCreateHash
CryptHashData
CryptDestroyHash
CryptGetHashParam
CryptReleaseContext
CryptSetKeyParam
CryptImportKey
CryptQueryObject
CertFreeCertificateContext
CertFindCertificateInStore
CryptMsgGetParam
CryptDecodeObjectEx
CryptImportPublicKeyInfo
CryptBinaryToStringA
CryptStringToBinaryA
CertGetNameStringW
CertCloseStore
CertFreeCertificateContext
CryptGetObjectUrl
CryptUIDlgSelectCertificateFromStore

69

virtual address descriptor structure, and monitoring the memory protection flag. I have
leveraged the memory forensic framework Volatility [99] to find out these artifacts.

5.15.1

Process Hierarchy

There are multiple processes are running in the system; mainly two types: background
and foreground. On a freshly installed system there is the defined relationship in the background processes. For instance, winlogon.exe is the parent process of lsass.exe on preVista operating systems. Similarly, wininit.exe is the parent process of lsass.exe on Vista
and later operating systems.

Figure 26: Detecting Malicious Process by parent child relationship
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As shown in Figure 26, process identifier 868 and 1928 are not started by winlogon.exe
or wininit.exe. But these processes were started by services.exe which has a process identifier 668. This implies that the system in affected by process injection [29]. I have extracted the injected code memory dump using procdump module as shown in Figure 27.

Figure 27: Extract injected code using procdump module
Procdump is a module which requires the name of the directory (use -D for directory)
where the injected code is extracted and the process identifier(pid) (-p868, 1028) of the
hijacked processes. The extracted codes are shown using ls command in injected_code
directory. These codes are PE files which perform code execution operation on victim’s
computer.
5.15.2

Comparing Process Execution Block (PEB) and Virtual Address Descriptor
(VAD) Structure

The process execution block contains the information of the process. The PEB structure
contains image information (base address, version numbers, module list), thread-local
storage utilization, and process heap information. The VAD provides the address space of
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a specified process. As shown in Figure 28, the module dlllist is used to extract the loaded
dynamic link libraries during the process execution. Similarly ldrmodules is used to read
VAD structure. It shows the suspicious process 868 does not mapped to corresponding
dlls.

Figure 28: Comparing PEB and VAD Structure
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5.16 Evaluation

I have evaluated CRDETECTOR with two experiments: pattern generate and validate pattern using binary files (e.g.malicious binaries). The goal of the first experiment is to build
the unique signatures from the crypto-ransomware samples, while the goal of the second
experiment is to demonstrate that CRDETECTOR can detect previously unknown cryptoransomware samples.

5.16.1

Experimental Setup

The CRDETECTOR prototype is built on the top of Cuckoo Sandbox [49]. Generally
Cuckoo provides multiple VMs on a single host and run them simultaneously. This way
I have analyzed large number of Ransomware on a single physical machine. I have evaluated CRDETECTOR using 35 virtual machines running Windows XP SP2. Windows XP
was chosen since it is well supported by the Cuckoo sandbox in addition dynamic analysis of ransomware can be effectively performed on Windows XP.
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Table 9: The list of the ransomware families used in the first experiment.

FAMILIES

Type

Date Appeared

# of Samples

R EVETON

locker

2012

29

G P C ODE

locker

2013

23

C RYPTO L OCKER

crypto

2013

4

C RYPTOWALL

crypto

2013

5

F ILE C RYPTO

crypto

2013

4

T ELSAC RYPT

crypto

2013

6

CTB-L OCKER

crypto

2014

3

C RYPTO M IX

crypto

2014

4

L OCKY

crypto

2014

5

C ERBER

crypto

2013

4

P ETYA

crypto

2016

3

N O P ETYA

crypto

2016

3

S ATANA

crypto

2016

4

J IG S AW

crypto

2016

3

S HADE

crypto

2015

5

WANNAC RY

crypto

2017

1

S AM S AM

crypto

2018

2

The operating system images captured using the Cuckoo Sandbox [49]. These images
contain the all the running processes, user level applications, and kernel data structures.
These images are analyzed using memory forensic perspective to understand the run-time
artifacts.
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5.16.2

Detection Results

Thirty-five crypto-ransomware samples and thirty-five normal binaries (thirty are regular applications and five are security tools) where the security tools include putty.exe,
FileZilla.exe, WinScp.exe, BitLocker.exe, and OpenSSHClient.exe.
The results of each method applied for detection of the crypto-ransomware as described
below:
Table 10: CRDETECTOR detection results based on cosine similarity score. 88.23% false
positive rate and 11.42% false negative.

Ransomware

Normal Binary

R ANSOMWARE

31

4

N ORMAL B INARY

30

5

Table 10 shows the evaluation results of the second experiment. There were 35 cryptoransomware samples are used in test data set. Out of 35, 21 crypto-ransomwares are detected as ransomware and 14 are detected as normal binary.which gives f p/( f p + f n)
88.23% of false positive rate and false negative rate is f n/( f n + t p) 11.42%.
Table 11: CRDETECTOR detection results based on association rule at assembly level
with 48.14% false positive rate and 40.00% false negative.

Ransomware

Normal Binary

R ANSOMWARE

21

14

N ORMAL B INARY

13

22

Table 11 shows the evaluation results of the second experiment. There were 35 cryptoransomware samples are used in test data set. Out of 35, 21 crypto-ransomwares are detected as ransomware and 14 are detected as normal binary which gives f p/( f p + f n)
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48.14% of false positive rate and false negative rate is f n/( f n + t p) 40.00%.

Table 12: CRDETECTOR detection results based on association rule at library level level
with 36.36% false positive rate and 40.00% false negative.

Ransomware

Normal Binary

R ANSOMWARE

21

14

N ORMAL B INARY

8

27

Table 12 shows the evaluation results of the second experiment. There were 35 cryptoransomware samples are used in test data set. Out of 35, 21 crypto-ransomwares are detected as ransomware and 14 are detected as normal binary which gives f p/( f p + f n)
48.14% of false positive rate and false negative rate is f n/( f n + t p) 40.00%.

Table 13: CRDETECTOR detection results based using function calls with 41.66% false
positive rate and 40.00% false negative.

Ransomware

Normal Binary

R ANSOMWARE

21

14

N ORMAL B INARY

10

25

Table 13 shows the evaluation results of the second experiment. There were 35 cryptoransomware samples are used in test data set. Out of 35, 21 crypto-ransomwares are detected as ransomware and 14 are detected as normal binary which gives f p/( f p + f n)
41.66% of false positive rate and false negative rate is f n/( f n + t p) 40.00%.
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Table 14: CRDETECTOR detection results based using dynamic analysis with 0.0% false
positive rate and 48.57% false negative.

Ransomware

Normal Binary

R ANSOMWARE

18

17

N ORMAL B INARY

0

35

Table 14 shows the evaluation results of the second experiment. There were 35 cryptoransomware samples are used in test data set. Out of 35, 18 crypto-ransomwares are detected as ransomware and 14 are detected as normal binary which gives f p/( f p + f n)
0.00% of false positive rate and false negative rate is f n/( f n + t p) 48.57%.

5.16.3

False Positives

I performed manual verification of the detection results. That is, for the binary files that
were detected as crypto-ransomware samples that were detected by CRDETECTOR.
CRDETECTOR reports a binary file as a crypto-ransomware if the multi-level code segment matched more than 90% score.

5.16.4

False Negatives

Evaluating false negative rates is very challenging since manually checking each samples
is not feasible. In out tests on the labeled dataset, false negatives mainly occurred in the
samples that use multiple-code obfuscation techniques applied in multiple levels (binary
level, function call level, and assembly level).

5.17 Summary
The conventional approaches of generating signatures based on the one-way hash function of a malware is not effective for crypto-ransomware since it can be easily bypassed.
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In this research, I proposed CRDETECTOR, a crypto-ransomware detection framework
which focused on building signatures using reverse engineering, similarity score, dynamic
analysis and data mining approach based on the FP-Growth algorithm. The signature is
generated combining static analysis and executing the crypto-ransomware sample in sandbox environment. Experimental evaluation and results show that CRDETECTOR is able
to detect crypto-ransomware attacks without major performance overhead. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• I have designed CRDETECTOR, an automatic combined (static and dynamic) analysis tool that leveraged the assembly instructions, PE file format, function calls,
runtime analysis of running processes, and process data structures to enhance signature for anti-virus engine.
• CRDETECTOR can detect the crypto-ransomware with semantically similar function blocks in multiple levels analysis.
• I have built the signature database specific to crypto-ransomware using the result of
CRDETECTOR.
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6

Security Analysis of InfiniBand(IB) Protocol

The growing popularity of high performance computing has led to a new focus on bypassing or eliminating traditional I/O operations that are usually the bottlenecks for processing
of large data volumes quickly. One such solution uses a new network communication protocol called InfiniBand (IB) which supports remote direct memory access without making two copies of data (one in user space and the other in kernel space) and thus provides
very low latency and very high throughput. To this end, for many industries, IB has now
become a promising inter-connect protocol over Ethernet technologies. Ensuring the security of this new protocol is critical since more and more companies are moving towards
it.
To ensure the security of IB, the first step is to have a thorough understand of the vulnerabilities of its current implementations, which unfortunately is still missing in the literature. In this paper, I aim to fill this gap. In particular, I have performed a static code analysis as well as protocol testing in order to examine security features in IB architecture
from the implementation perspective. While our extensive penetration testing could not
find any significant security loopholes; there are certain aspects in both the design and
the implementations that need to be addressed. Our focus is in the implementation perspective. Specifically, I have found there is a significant use for a number of vulnerable
functions (e.g., memcpy, sprintf, and char) as well as obsolete functions (e.g., memalign)
that I believe should be replaced with alternative functions such as memmove, snprintf,
getline, and posix_memalign. I believe my work will benefit both the protocol developers
as well as users by elucidating the first step to ensure the security of IB protocol.

6.1

Introduction

The rapid growth of various applications such as social networking, mobile computing,
and search engines has created large volumes of complex data. This requires a very real
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need to securely store, transfer, and process this high volume of unstructured data. Legacy
network interfaces are not suitable for satisfying such strict requirements, as they all suffer from a major bottleneck – the operating system’s kernel needs to make at lease one
copy of the incoming/outgoing data (from the network interface) internally before making it available at the user level buffer[50]. The best solution for addressing this problem is the use of a remote direct memory access (RDMA) system[55], which provides
the ability for one machine to directly access (read/write) the memory of another remote
machine. RDMA has evolved from DMA which allows direct memory access in local
machine without CPU involvement. There are different network protocols that support
RDMA such as InfiniBand (IB)[37], RDMA over Converged Ethernet (RoCE)[37], and
Internet wide area RDMA Protocol (iWARP). All of these network protocols sharing the
same application programming interfaces (APIs) form a completely new networking protocol layer. IB was proposed by InfiniBand Trade Association (IBTA) as an open standard, interconnect protocol to overcome the bulk data transfer problem. It can provide
the most efficient way for storing and processing large volumes of data which are typical
in data center operations. In addition, it supports server virtualization, overlay networks,
and software defined network (SDN), making it feasible as the inter-connect networking protocol for the foreseeable future. Compared to RoCE and iWARP, IB offers several
advantages, including high bandwidth, low latency, good quality of service, great scalability/flexibility, high CPU offloads, and easy management.
Given that IB is quickly gaining in popularity, ensuring its security is imperative. A recent
vulnerability in IB implementation is the use of write function as bi-directional ioclt()
which is fundamentally unsafe, as it allows triggering write function calls from different
contexts to carry out privilege escalation[7]. To ensure the security of IB, it is non-trivial
to understand the security of IB implementations by performing a thorough security analysis, because: first, IB protocol is implemented by different vendors via hardware and device drivers. The diversity of the IB implementations may significantly increase the attack
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surface. Second, as a software component which is executed in the supervisor mode and
provides interfaces for the kernel to access the hardware devices, device drivers may provide an avenue for attackers to escalate the privileges to the supervisor/admin level [40],
since a substantial amount of device driver code resides in kernel space. It is thus very
necessary to understand the security vulnerabilities of this code base.
However, it is challenging to perform security analysis on current IB implementations because: First, I lack specific tools for IB, as the available tools are unable to consider the
vulnerable functions used in the IB implementations. Specifically, all the exiting opensource analysis tools which contain databases of the vulnerable functions are not updated
with the most recent IB implementations. To confirm this, I have tried to find all the functions used in the IB implementations using the existing tools, but I was not able to list
all the functions being used as well as their corresponding frequencies of use. Second,
the existing analysis tools do not consider the ratio between the number of the vulnerable
functions and the lines of source code being analyzed, and I thus cannot obtain from these
tools the different interfaces involved to accomplish the data transfer between two nodes.
Third, performing dynamic analysis on IB requires setting up new devices, which further requires installation of device drivers as well as setup of network components. However, it is usually complicate to ensure correct configuration and setup. In this research, I
have performed a comprehensive security analysis on the implementations of IB protocol
from nine different vendors. The implementations include all the device driver application programming interfaces (APIs) as well as the user-level libraries. I have started by
performing a static code analysis on the IB implementations using various static analysis
techniques and tools. To have a thorough understanding of the run-time behavior of the
program, I also performed dynamic analysis by setting up and configuring necessary infrastructures. To the best of our knowledge, this research work is the first to evaluate the
security of IB implementations from a system’s purview. Our security analysis revealed
that there are security vulnerabilities in the IB implementations: 1) The use of vulnerable
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functions like memcpy, sprinf, and char. The memcpy function does not check the length
of user controlled input when copying data from source to destination. This may allow
the attacker to overlap other region of memory with the code he/she controls. The secure
alternative of memcpy function is memmove. Similarly, the secure alternative for sprintf
and char are snprintf and getline, respectively. 2) The use of vulnerable functions in userlevel libraries like memalign. The memalign function will return the block of memory
in a successful case otherwise it will return NULL pointer. Its security impact is huge as
the attacker can control the return value and redirect the control to his/her own choice of
code. The memalign function can be replaced by either posix_memalign or aligned_alloc
which will return zero upon being unable to allocate requested memory size

6.2
6.2.1

Background
IB Protocol and Architecture

The InfiniBand system mainly consists of three components: the user-level library, the device independent application programming Interfaces (APIs), and the device drivers. The
user-level library runs at user level, while the device independent APIs (i.e., kernel verbs)
and device drivers are executed at kernel level. InfiniBand is a new architecture to support
higher bandwidth as well as to provide support on legacy architecture. A general architecture of IB software components is shown in Figure 29. Note that the most commonly
available user level library is libibverbs. InfiniBand is a layer-based protocol as depicted
in Figure 30. As a new interconnect architecture which supports different layers where
each layer provides functionality to the upper layer. InfiniBand also supports services to
the existing TCP/IP network interconnect. IB supports four different connection types
at layer 2: Reliable Connection (RC), Unreliable Connection (UC), Reliable Datagram
(RD), and Unreliable Datagram (UD). IB utilizes a queue-based model: a Send Queue
(SQ), a Receive Queue (RQ), and a Completion Queue (CQ). The transport layer provides
different level of queues, and each queue handles four types of data transfer including
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Figure 29: General architecture of InfiniBand software components [8]

Send/Receive, RDMA Write, RDMA Read, and RDMA Atomics.
IB physical architecture IB devices use serial links which are high-speed and bi-directional.
It comes at different data rates such as single data rate (SDR) and double data rate (DDR).
IB protocol packet formats IB uses a routable packet unit that carries IBA operations
in the fabric. The packet [83] is built using many different fields. The fields are Local
Routing Header (LRH), Global Route Header (GRH), Base Transport Header (BTH), Extended Transport Header (ETH), Payload (with size 0 to 4096 bytes), Invariant Cyclic
Redundancy Check (ICRC), and Variant Cyclic Redundancy Check (VCRC). This information is important to build attack surface (CVE-2001-0144).
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Figure 30: Different layers of InfiniBand and their inter-dependency [74]
6.2.2

Taxonomy of Kernel Vulnerabilities

Our approach uses the following taxonomy of kernel vulnerabilities [82]:
1. Nonvalidated / Uninitialized / Corrupted pointer dereference: This is one of
the famous kernel bug classes. This class is related to a pointer declared as a local
variable in a function.
2. Memory corruption vulnerability: There are two types of kernel memory: the
kernel stack, which is associated with each thread/process whenever it runs at the
kernel level and kernel heap, which is used each time when a kernel needs to allocate a small object or some temporary space. Each user-land process runs on a system that has at least two stacks: user-land stack and kernel-land stack. The kernel
stack is used when the process switches to kernel space by calling system function
calls. The kernel stack is limited in size (4KB or 8KB on x86 architecture), and this
is why the paradigm of using has few local variables as possible when preforming
kernel programming. So, kernel stack vulnerabilities are not much different from
their user-land counterparts and are usually the consequence of writing past the
boundaries of a stack allocated buffer. Vulnerabilities occur due to the using of un84

safe functions such as strcpy() or sprintf(). The stack plays a very important role in
the application binary interfaces (ABIs) of a specific architecture, hence exploiting
kernel stack vulnerabilities can be architecture dependent. Kernel uses a separate
memory allocator, slab allocator, to allocate memory in kernel level. There was a
vulnerability on slab allocator in old version of kernel, namely, CVE-2008-1673.

3. Integer issues: The most common type of bugs related with integer is integer overflow and sign conversion issues. This class of vulnerabilities is not exploitable but
it may lead to other vulnerabilities such as memory overflows. This is due to wild
multiplication/increments/decrements. The sign conversion issues are related by
evaluating some integer values as signed by integer first and then as an unsigned
one (or vice versa).

4. Race conditions: Race condition is defined when tow or more processes are about
to perform an operation and the results from their operation will be different depending on the order they execute. There are different synchronization mechanisms
used in kernel such as locks, conditional variables, semaphores, etc. Race condition
is very difficult to trigger, i.e., small trigger windows.

5. Logic bugs: There are three types of common logic bugs: kernel-generated userland vulnerabilities, physical device input validation, and reference counter overflow. Kernel-generated user-land vulnerabilities are present in the interface between
kernel and user space such as udevd. Physical device input validation vulnerabilities are becoming popular because device drivers are not able to handle a system
crash. For example, there is a recent usb attack on Windows 8 and MAC OSX login
by pass [79]. Reference counter overflow vulnerabilities are common while keeping
track of the resources.
85

6.2.3

Tools Used in Our Security Analysis

I rely on three tools to perform static analysis: Flawfinder, Splint, and Sparse. The dynamic testing is performed using Melkor.
1. Flawfinder: Flawfinder [101] is a static code analysis tool which has a database
of C/C++ functions with well-known issues, such as format string vulnerabilities
([v]snprintf(), [v][f]printf(), and syslog()), buffer overflow vulnerabilities (strcpy(),
gets(), sprintf(), scanf(), and gethostbyname()), race conditions (access(), chown(),
chmod(), tmpfile(), tmpnam(), tempnam(), and mktemp()), potential shell metacharacter dangers (exec() family, system(), popen()), and poor random number generator (random()).
2. Splint: Splint [52] is one of the most popular open source tools for analyzing source
code statically. I have ran Splint against all of the kernel modules, and use default
annotation provided by Splint.
3. Sparse: Sparse [95] is a semantic parser which can provide front-end capability of parsing most of GCC extensions as well as ANSI C program. I have used
Sparse [95] to analyze the IB component of the source code while compiling the
kernel source code using $ make C=2 staging/drivers/infiniband/.
4. Melkor: I have used Melkor [62] to generate test data to perform fuzz testing.

6.3

Approach

Performing security analysis on the software written in native languages such as C/C++ is
necessary to find out the security weaknesses while implementing the given specifications
of different vendors. I have performed static analysis on IB implementations using our
own developing static analysis tools to enumerate all the possible vulnerable functions
in the application programming interfaces (APIs), and using the existing static tools to
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carry out rigorous analysis such as null pointer dereference, type mismatching, etc. After
having performed static analysis to find out lower hanging weaknesses, I also performed
dynamic analysis to find out the functions and parameters being used when the system is
in running state. In the following, I first outline the rationale behind our approach, then
describe the details of our static and dynamic analysis on IB.

6.3.1

Rationale

To understand the vulnerabilities of IB implementations, I have performed both the static
analysis and the dynamic analysis on them. The static analysis is performed using our
static analysis tool which is built specifically for IB implementations. The code bases
from nine different vendors are processed, detecting the suspected list of vulnerable functions with corresponding frequencies. I have used code annotation to detect vulnerabilities in functions such as null parameter, tainted data, control flow analysis, and secure
coding practice. I have performed code analysis by doing code annotation to test for nonvalidated, uninitialized, corrupted pointer dereference, memory corruption vulnerability,
etc. In this way, I have used the methodologies to identify any missing security related
issues in the IB implementations.
Only applying static analysis is usually not enough as it is not able to capture the execution behavior of each software component. As we know, the security of a system is only
as strong as its weakest link [54]. The system’s execution behavior shows its actual flow
of data through the interfaces. By enumerating all the interfaces involved as well as the
data flow, I am able to obtain the weakest links if present. One of the common problems
in security is user controlled input data. When the user controlled input data violate the
data context and are interpreted as code, a “code injection” attack happens.
The IB consists of different interfaces which are including from build-in libraries as well
as the IB application programming interfaces. These interfaces are important to reveal any
security issues. I have performed dynamic analysis to capture the execution path and the
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data flow among all the APIs. The dynamic analysis requires setting up and configuring
hardware devices specific to IB and all the software components involved. I have ran each
user level program and capture executions of the programs specific to IB using ltrace and
strace. I have also developed a tool which can process the output of these functions and
create the state diagram. This tool is very flexible and can be used by other tools to create
a state-diagram with output. In addition, I have performed fuzz testing on each module
in kernel space. Fuzz testing covers each section of executable and linking format (ELF).
The purpose of fuzz test is to cover the input validation while parsing ELF files.
In addition, I have also performed dynamic analysis on the IB components during running. The dynamic analysis provides all the application programming interfaces involved
while moving data from source to destination. I try to transfer bulk data to learn how the
system handles large-size data. This is one form of fuzz testing in dynamic analysis.

6.3.2

Static Analysis

Static analysis is a technique which can find out vulnerabilities in the source code without
running it. In general, static analysis requires the source code of the software being analyzed. For IB implementations, I have access to the source code. Static analysis can be
performed using two options: manual code review and automatic scanning tools. Manual
code review however, does not scale well for large code bases, therefore I rely on automatic tools.
In our static analysis, I have first used tools to gather statistics on the source code, and
then use the static analyzer to find out vulnerable functions. Once I obtained the name of
the vulnerable functions, I further use white box testing to detect vulnerabilities. Note that
these vulnerable functions will be the primary target to perform dynamic analysis.
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6.3.3

Gathering the Source Code Statistics

I have used the static analysis tool I designed and implemented to obtain statistics on the
source code including the number of c program files, header files, line of source code,
number of structures. The results of our purposed static analyzer will be presented in Section 6.4.
6.3.4

Detecting Vulnerability

Once I have gathered necessary information on the target source code, I have performed
vulnerabilities discovery using white box testing to perform static analysis, which is accomplished either with the assistance of automation tools or manually. I have used the
static analyzed developed by myself to perform initial static analysis to find the number of
vulnerable functions with respect to the size of source code, and then use the automated
tools (Flawfinder, Sparse, and Splint) to perform white box testing. The automated tools
fall into three categories - compile time checkers, source code browsers, and automated
source code auditing tools [93]. The source code is analyzed using Splint. I use following
example code (see the sample code below) snipped to find the vulnerabilities.
Bisection($/*@only@*/ char *link$)
...
return $*link$
Demo1($char *s$)
return $*s$
Demo1_with_annot($/*@null@*/ char *s$)
return $*s$
6.3.5

Dynamic Analysis

Static analysis is unfortunately not able to capture run-time behavior of the program (as
mentioned in [93], “Keep in mind, however, that what you see is not necessarily what you
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execute when it comes to source code”). To address this limitation, I have thus performed
dynamic analysis. The dynamic analysis is usually performed when the target application is running, and can provide the exact flow of data from different interfaces involved.
Specifically, it can capture the exact run of the programs [38] and can help detect vulnerabilities which cannot be detected by static analysis. For example, by using dynamic
analysis, a recent vulnerability is found in glibc library function [3].

The dynamic analysis is performed using fuzz testing. When using fuzz testing, I have
considered only the input and output relation. I have generated and send inputs which
are crafted for fuzzing purpose, and to observe the response of the running program. The
main advantages of fuzz testing are availability, reproducibility, and simplicity, and the
main disadvantages are code coverage and intelligence. The testing is performed in executable file formats, which have different sections such as data section, code section, stack
section, etc. ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) [45] is a common file format for executables, object code, shared libraries, and core dumps in Linux-like operating system.
The working ELF modules from nine different vendors are used as a seed. I have performed fuzz testing on all the modules used in IB from those vendors. Melkor is used to
generate fuzz data, by which I have generated five thousand test data to fuzz each module. I have observed the kernel logs in monitor mode while loading and unloading each
module.

At a high level, there are three steps to perform dynamic analysis: installation and configuration, monitoring execution flow, and capturing the execution flow. To have a clear
picture from the captured execution flow, I have created a state diagram by processing
the execution flow which can show the functions being used and parameters being passed
from one function to another.
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6.4

Experimental Results

In this section, I have presented our experimental results for our static and dynamic analysis.
Experimental setup I have used two servers with hardware and software components
(server 1: AMD Opteron 4256 EE 1.6GHz, Linux 2.6.18-406.el5; server 2: Intel Xeon
X5650 @ 2.67GHz, Linux 2.6.18-406.el5). I have used Mellanox Certified Refurbished
MC1104130-001 Passive Copper Cable InfiniBand CX4, which supports DDR 20Gb/s. I
have also used the Infiniband adaptor QLE 7240.

6.4.1

Static Analysis

I have used my purposed static analyzer to perform initial code analysis. Then I have used
Flawfinder, Splint, and Sparse to perform static analysis and show the results respectively.

6.4.2

Flawfinder Result

I have ran Flawfinder over the source code in the system where I have installed hardware
device. According to the QLogic recommendation, I have used CentOS 2.6.18-406.el5
with Linux kernel 2.6.18. Flawfinder discovered a number of vulnerabilities based on the
taxonomy described in Section 6.2.2. As we know, the vulnerability counts vary with the
lines of source code (LOC). I have normalized these counts using Formula 2.

Normalized_Count =

counts
#LOC

(2)

All the results are shown after the counts are normalized. Figure 31 shows three important
functions which cause vulnerabilities if used incorrectly: (buffer)char, (buffer)memcpy,
and (buffer)sprintf. These functions are vulnerable to memory overwrite, memory overread, and format string. Different colors show different vendors and bar lines show the
frequency of these functions.In particular for each outlier, I have observed that the mlx4
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Table 15: IB source code statistics: number of C programs, functions, data structures
2.6.18

4.2.3

Count

INCLUDE / RDMA

DRIVERS / INFINIBAND

INCLUDE / RDMA

DRIVERS / INFINIBAND

C F ILES
H EADER F ILES
LOC
S TRUCT
E NUM
U NION
M EMCPY
M ALLOC
K MALLOC
K FREE
R EALLOC
D ELETE
G OTO

0
16
5411
704
99
28
4
0
0
0
0
0
0

76
26
17185
236
62
2
120
0
140
371
0
0
1352

0
20
7388
996
180
49
10
0
0
0
0
0
0

221
110
27410
1063
379
55
478
0
318
1275
0
0
4246

driver has the highest number of vulnerabilities. In addition, I have observed that (buffer)
memcpy is more prevalent than the other outliers. The results of the static analysis are
shown in Table 15.
Since the IB implementations in kernel 2.6.18 is comparatively old compared to the latest
stable kernel 4.2.3 (at the time of our evaluation), I have thus ran Flawfinder using kernel
4.2.3 and plotted those three outliers: (buffer)char, (buffer)memcpy, and (buffer)sprintf.
Note that I have also used the normalized counts of vulnerabilities. The results are shown
in Figure 32. I have observed that the plot pattern in both versions (2.6.18 and 4.2.3) is
similar. To further evaluate the differences, I have plotted the absolute difference of the
normalized counts of the static code vulnerabilities, and the results are shown in Figure 33. I have observed that in the latest IB, the aforementioned three vulnerabilities have
been fixed to a certain extent. However, they still exist (Figure 32).

6.4.3

Splint Result

I have performed data-flow and control-flow analysis using Splint. Spring has the ability
to interpret special annotations to the source code, and can be used for various tests, including null pointer, memory leaking, dangling pointer, buffer overflow, etc. There were
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Figure 31: Flawfinder Results of Linux Kernel 2.6.18
no serious vulnerabilities being found in Splint.

6.4.4

Sparse Result

I have performed static type-checking using Sparse. Sparse is used while configuring the
kernel to enable IB kernel drivers. There were no serious vulnerabilities being found in
kernel drivers.

6.5

Dynamic Analysis

I have configured and set up two servers to perform dynamic analysis, using QLE 7240 IB
adaptors. The necessary condition for the dynamic analysis is a properly running environment. The dynamic analysis is performed using fuzz testing and the run time execution
is monitored. The fuzzing testing is carried out on all the available kernel modules of all
vendors, and the run time execution is monitored using ltrace and strace, which are used
to find all the system calls associated with user level programs [92]. The corresponding
state diagram was drawn based on the output of ltrace and strace.
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Figure 32: Flawfinder Results of Linux Kernel 4.2.3
6.5.1

Fuzz Testing

I have performed fuzz testing, a technique closely related to boundary value analysis
(BVA) [77], to obtain better coverage of the security analysis over IB. The ELF header
contains meta-information specific to particular file, and I fuzzed headers of all the modules possessed by the user space ELFs using Melkor Fuzzer. I used the user level ELFs
as our seed input. I generated six sets of test data using different values of n (i.e., 500,
1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, and 3000) and the following command snippet: # ./melkor -l 20
-n {500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000} templates/elf_name.
The “templates” directory contains all the modules, and I used each module as test data to
generate fuzzed data. All these data sets were used to check whether all kernel modules
can crash or produce errors. I did not find any such crash or errors while running executables. I also observed that all the user-level ELFs are stripped which is good from the
security perspective.
Similarly, I have performed ELF section fuzzing of all the kernel modules (Table 16). After having generated all the test kernel modules, I have loaded each module. As shown
in Table 16, three of the vendor’s modules crashed. I monitored the kernel log to find the
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Table 16: Kernel Level ELF Modules
Module Name
amso1100/iw_c2.ko
cxgb3/iw_cxgb3.ko
cxgb4/iw_cxgb4.ko
ipath/ib_ipath.ko
mlx4/mlx4_ib.ko
mthca/ib_mthca.ko
nes/iw_nes.ko
qib/ib_qib.ko

Type
ELF 64-bit relocatable, not stripped
ELF 64-bit relocatable, not stripped
ELF 64-bit relocatable, not stripped
ELF 64-bit relocatable, not stripped
ELF 64-bit relocatable, not stripped
ELF 64-bit relocatable, not stripped
ELF 64-bit relocatable, not stripped
ELF 64-bit relocatable, not stripped

Size in Memory (bytes)
Module Error
109725
Module Error
361893
361893
156644
223209
Module Error

reason behind the crash, but unfortunately, I have not identified any significant reasons
for the crash. I have also observed that all the kernel ELFs are not stripped. I have recommend that all the modules should be stripped for security consideration. In addition, five
other vendors’ modules were loaded successfully without causing errors.

6.5.2

API Call Graph

The dynamic analysis is performed using strace and ltrace. The output produced by both
tools were further processed using customized Python program to generate TikZ file, by
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matching function names specific to IB operations. Then, I have used the TikZ file to
draw a state diagram in Figure 34. The diagram offers a clear picture about which functions are used while IB protocol is in use. The node of the state diagram represents the
function name and edge represents the order in which these functions are called.

6.6

Related Work

Aron Warren [100] performed an equivalent of Ethernet’s MAC address spoofing vulnerability in InfiniBand. The equivalent vulnerability in IB is an HCA GUIDs poisoning attack. Manhee et al. [72] considered several aspects of security such as availability, confidentiality, and authentication, but they only mentioned enhancing confidentiality by using
Invariant Cyclic Redundancy Check (ICRC) field as an authentication tag.
The static analysis is one of the popular methods used to find vulnerabilities in software.
There are a number of static analysis tools, including Flawfinder [101], Splint [52], and
Sparse [95]. As we can see from the CERN [19], Flawfinder [101] is recommended because it is an effective static code analyzer for analyzing software written in C/C++. In
addition to these open source tools, there are also several proprietary tools available like
Coverity [1], Fortify [5], and MAYHEM [43]. These tools can support more advanced
analysis.
In the following, I have outlined the rationale behind our approach, and then describe the
details of our static and dynamic analysis on IB.

6.7

Rationale

To understand the vulnerabilities of IB implementations, I have performed both static and
dynamic analysis on them. The static analysis is performed using our static analysis tool
which is built specifically for IB implementations. The code bases from nine different
vendors are processed, detecting the suspected list of vulnerable functions with corresponding frequencies. I have used code annotation to detect vulnerabilities in functions
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such as null parameter, tainted data, control flow analysis, and secure coding practice. I
have performed code analysis by doing code annotation to test for non-validated, uninitialized, corrupted pointer dereference, memory corruption vulnerability, etc. In this way I
am able to find out any missing security related issues in the IB implementations.
Only applying static analysis is usually not sufficient as it is not able to capture the execution behavior of each software component. As we know, the security of a system is only
as strong as its weakest link [54]. The system’s execution behavior shows its actual flow
of data through the interfaces. By enumerating all the interfaces involved as well as the
data flow, I could able to obtain the weakest links if present. One of the common problems in security is user controlled input data. When the user controlled input data violate
the data context and are interpreted as code, a “code injection” attack happens.
The IB consists of different interfaces which are included from build-in libraries as well
as the IB application programming interfaces. These interfaces are crucial to reveal any
security issues. I have performed dynamic analysis to capture the execution path and the
data flow among all the APIs. The dynamic analysis requires setting up and configuring
hardware devices specific to IB and all the software components involved. I have ran each
user level program and capture executions of the programs specific to IB using ltrace and
strace. I have also developed a tool which can process the output of these functions and
create the state diagram. This tool is very flexible and can be used by other tools to create
a state-diagram with output. In addition, I have performed fuzz testing on each module
in kernel space. Fuzz testing covers each section of executable and linking format (ELF).
The purpose of fuzz test is to cover the input validation while parsing ELF files.
I have also performed dynamic analysis on the IB components while running. The dynamic analysis provides all the application programming interfaces involved while moving data from source to destination. I have tried to transfer bulk data to learn how the system handles large-size data. This is one form of fuzz testing in dynamic analysis.
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6.8

Static Analysis

Static analysis is a technique which can find out vulnerabilities in the source code without running it. In general, static analysis requires the source code of the software being
analyzed. For IB implementations, I am able to get the access to the source code. Static
analysis can be performed using two options: manual code review and automatic scanning
tools. Manual code review however, does not scale well for large code bases, and thus I
rely on automatic tools.
In our static analysis, I first used tools to gather statistics on the source code, and then
use the static analyzer to find out vulnerable functions. Once I obtained the name of the
vulnerable functions, I further used white box testing to detect vulnerabilities. Note that
these vulnerable functions will be the primary target to perform dynamic analysis.

6.8.1

Detecting Vulnerability

Once I have gathered necessary information on the target source code, I performed vulnerabilities discovery using white box testing to perform static analysis, which is accomplished either with the assistance of automation tools or manually. I used our developed
static analyzer to perform initial static analysis to find the number of vulnerable functions with respect to the size of source code, and then use the automated tools (Flawfinder,
Sparse, and Splint) to perform white box testing. The automated tools fall into three categories - compile time checkers, source code browsers, and automated source code auditing tools [93]. The source code is analyzed using Splint. I used following example code
(see the sample code below) snipped to find the vulnerabilities.
Bisection($/*@only@*/ char *link$)
...
return $*link$
Demo1($char *s$)
return $*s$
99

Demo1_with_annot($/*@null@*/ char *s$)
return $*s$

6.9

Dynamic Analysis

Static analysis is unfortunately not able to capture run-time behavior of the program (as
mentioned in [93], “Keep in mind, however, that what you see is not necessarily what you
execute when it comes to source code”). I thus performed dynamic analysis to address
this limitation. The dynamic analysis is usually performed when the target application is
running, and can provide the exact flow of data from different interfaces involved. Specifically, it can capture the exact run of the programs [38] and can help detect vulnerabilities
which cannot be detected by static analysis. For example, by using dynamic analysis, a
recent vulnerability is found in glibc library function [3].
The dynamic analysis is performed using fuzz testing. When using fuzz testing, I have
considered only the input and output relation. I have generated the inputs which are crafted
for fuzzing and send these inputs, and observe the response of the running program. The
main advantages of fuzz testing are availability, reproducibility, and simplicity, and the
main disadvantages are code coverage and intelligence. The testing is performed in the
executable file formats, which have different sections such as data section, code section,
stack section, etc. ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) [45] is a common file format
for executables, object code, shared libraries, and core dumps in Linux-like operating system. The working ELF modules from nine different vendors are used as a seed. I have
performed fuzz testing on all the modules used in IB from those vendors. Melkor is used
to generate fuzz data, by which I have generated five thousand test data to fuzz each module. I observed kernel logs in monitor mode while loading and unloading each module.
At a high level, there are three steps to perform dynamic analysis: installation and configuration, monitoring execution flow, and capturing the execution flow. To have a clear
picture from the captured execution flow, I have also created a state diagram by process100

ing the execution flow which can show the functions being used and parameters being
passed from one function to another.

6.10 Summary
In this research, I have reported the results of our security analysis on InfiniBand; in particular, the overall implemented codebase [37] and the architecture. I have used the penetration testing technique to discover vulnerabilities. To perform static analysis, I used
Flawfinder, Splint, and Sparse. The black box testing is performed using Melkor. I have
checked on the parsing phase of user space and kernel space modules. I also gathered information regarding system calls being used and parameters of these system calls. I have
found four vulnerable functions, three are located in the kernel space and one is in the
user-space libraries.
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7

Conclusion and Future Work

Ransomware attack use many tricks of Social Engineering (to get into the system), Virus
properties (propagation, triggering and execution), cryptographic techniques (to lock system), use remote command and control (C&C) channel and crypto-currencies. In addition, ransomware attacks exploit system weakness such as SMB vulnerabilities (MS-17010), weak credentials to get into the system. Ransomware generally encrypts the data
in a victim’s computer and ask for ransom to get the decryption key. Cyber-criminals are
using ransomware attacks frequently because it is very easy to make quick money. Moreover, the monetary transactions performed remained intractable due to the use of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Each year new ransomware are released with advanced exploit
techniques and attack vectors. In May 2017, a widespread ransomware campaign was
launched affecting as many as 150 countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, France and Japan. The latest version of this ransomware is named as
WannaCry, WCry or WannaDecryptor and requested a ransom amount of 0.1781 bitcoins
roughly $300 US dollars [26]. Recently in March 2018, another variant of ransomware is
named as SamSam and impacted multiple industries including City of Atlanta, Government and requested a total of roughly $900K US dollars ransom[17]. Similar to malware,
ransomware utilizes all types of means (e.g., spam emails, mal-advertisements, social engineering) to propagate to a victim’s computing system. Then, it will either lock the victim’s system (i.e., locker ransomware) or encrypt the data (i.e., crypto-ransomware) in
the victim’s systems. Finally, it will require the victim to pay the ransom money in order
to unlock the system or obtain the key for decrypting the data. According to the recent Internet Security Threat Report[11], the crypto-ransomware now dominates the ransomware
family. In this study, I mainly focused on static analysis assisted with reverse engineering
of crypto-ransomware families.
This dissertation draws the following conclusions: I proposed and implemented DARFR
framework using two subcomponent: RDS3 and CRDETECTOR.
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RDS3, a ransomware defense approach which focuses on restoring the data corrupted by
ransomware. By backing up data to the spare space, and making those space inaccessible for the ransomware through isolation, I made it possible to recover the encrypted data,
regardless of what privilege the ransomware can obtain. Security analysis and experimental evaluation show that RDS3 is able to mitigate ransomware attacks with an acceptable
performance overhead.
The conventional approaches of generating signatures based on the one-way hash function
of a malware is not effective for crypto-ransomware since it can be easily bypassed. In
this work, I proposed CRDETECTOR, a crypto-ransomware detection framework which
focused on building signatures using reverse engineering, similarity score, dynamic analysis and data mining approach based on the FP-Growth algorithm. The signature is generated combining static analysis and executing the crypto-ransomware sample in sandbox
environment. Experimental evaluation and results show that CRDETECTOR is able to
detect crypto-ransomware attacks without major performance overhead. My contribution
can be summarized as follows:
• I designed CRDETECTOR, an automatic combined (static and dynamic) analysis
tool that leveraged the assembly instructions, PE file format, function calls, runtime
analysis of running processes, and process data structures to enhance signature for
anti-virus engine.
• CRDETECTOR can detect the crypto-ransomware with semantically similar function blocks in multiple levels of analysis.
• I built the signature database specific to crypto-ransomware using the result of
CRDETECTOR.
I reported the results of our security analysis on InfiniBand, in particular, the overall implemented codebase [37] and the architecture. I used the penetration testing technique to
discover vulnerabilities. To perform static analysis, I used Flawfinder, Splint, and Sparse.
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The black box testing is performed using Melkor. I checked on the parsing phase of user
space and kernel space modules. I also gathered information regarding system calls being used and parameters of these system calls. I found four vulnerable functions, three are
located in the kernel space and one is in the user-space libraries.
In the future, research may be extended in the following directions:
• Improve the detection rules applying the machine learning algorithms.
• Investigate deep learning with more ransomware samples.
In future work, a comparison with other ransomware detection techniques needs to be
performed for further analysis. Correlation among different level analysis of ransomware
will provide better detection and localize the malicious code segments. Lastly, efforts will
be needed to generate more complex rules to improve detectability of ransomware.
In future, cryptojacking [2] displaces ransomware attacks as top malware threat in 2018.
This trend will be an interesting area of future research.
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Appendix A

Source Code

import requests
import json
import time

resource_id=
’ ffa7d98c62f4c810ac2b17d424ddebb8358581de0e17b102b5190c3d43189623 ’
u r l = ’ h t t p s : / / www. v i r u s t o t a l . com / v t a p i / v2 / f i l e / r e p o r t ’

for resource_id in file_handle :
params = { ’ apikey ’ : ’< api_key > ’ , ’ r e s o u r c e ’ : r e s o u r c e _ i d }
headers = {
" Accept −E n c o d i n g " : " g z i p , d e f l a t e " ,
" User−Agent " : " g z i p ,
My P y t h o n r e q u e s t s l i b r a r y e x a m p l e c l i e n t o r u s e r n a m e "
}
response =
requests . get ( url ,
p a r a m s = params , h e a d e r s = h e a d e r s )
json_response = response . json ()
i f ’ Malwarebytes ’ in j s o n _ r e s p o n s e [ ’ scans ’ ] . keys ( ) :
i f j s o n _ r e s p o n s e [ ’ s c a n s ’ ] [ ’ M a l w a r e b y t e s ’ ] [ ’ r e s u l t ’ ] i s None :
r e s u l t = ’ None ’
else :
r e s u l t = j s o n _ r e s p o n s e [ ’ scans ’ ] [ ’ Malwarebytes ’ ] [ ’ r e s u l t ’ ]
myvalue = r e s o u r c e _ i d + "== >" + r e s u l t + " \ n "
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p r i n t myvalue
f i l e _ h a n d l e _ o u t p u t . w r i t e ( myvalue )
file_handle_output . flush ()
time . sleep (16)
file_handle . close ()
file_handle_output . close ()

i m p o r t o r g . a p a c h e . s p a r k . m l l i b . fpm . FPGrowth
i m p o r t o r g . a p a c h e . s p a r k . r d d .RDD

l o c a t i o n 1 = " h d f s : / / namenode : 9 0 0 0 / / m a l w a r e _ b i n a r y / d l l s . t x t "
location2 =
" h d f s : / / namenode : 9 0 0 0 / / m a l w a r e _ b i n a r y / a s s e m b l y _ i n s t r u c t i o n s . t x t "

val data = sc . t e x t F i l e ( l o c a t i o n 1 )

/ / val data = sc . t e x t F i l e ( l o c a t i o n 2 )

v a l c r y p t o r a n s o m w a r e : RDD[ A r r a y [ S t r i n g ] ] =
d a t a . map ( s => s . t r i m . s p l i t ( ’ , ’ ) )

v a l f p g = new FPGrowth ( )
. setMinSupport ( . 9 )
. setNumPartitions (5)
v a l model = f p g . r u n ( c r y p t o r a n s o m w a r e )
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model . f r e q I t e m s e t s . c o l l e c t ( ) . f o r e a c h { i t e m s e t =>
p r i n t l n ( i t e m s e t . items . mkString ( " [ " , " , " , " ] " ) +
" , " + itemset . freq )
}

val minConfidence =.9
model . g e n e r a t e A s s o c i a t i o n R u l e s ( m i n C o n f i d e n c e )
. c o l l e c t ( ) . f o r e a c h { r u l e =>
println (
r u l e . a n t e c e d e n t . mkString ( " [ " , " , " , " ] " )
+ " => " + r u l e . c o n s e q u e n t . m k S t r i n g ( " [ " , " , " , " ] " )
+ " , " + rule . confidence )
}
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